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Many toys on the market are becoming integrated with the sensory and networking 
capabilities of mobile technology. Toy computing is an emerging area of research with 
the characteristics of physical computing, services computing, mobile technologies, and 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). There is currently no standard privacy-preserving 
framework for mobile toy computing applications. Children’s privacy is becoming a 
major concern for parents who wish to protect their children from potential harms 
related to the collection or misuse of their private data, particularly their location. This 
thesis provides an access control model for location privacy for children in the mobile 
toy computing environment. From this model we derive a policy specification language 
using XACML vocabulary with extensions for location privacy, as well as a technical 
framework to enforce the policies. Finally, the framework is tested through prototyping 
and case studies for proof of concept.  
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  Introduction Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction to Toy Industry 
Toys have been a part of human existence for thousands of years, across every culture, 
being uncovered from as far back as ancient Egyptian times. A toy is an item or product 
intended for learning or play, which can have various benefits to childhood 
development. Toys can have a variety of purposes including education, leisure, and 
socialization. As such a substantial part of the human development, toys have continued 
to maintain a presence in the daily lives of billions of individuals of all ages. While 
primitive toys included rocks and pinecones, they soon progressed into dolls, stuffed 
animals and trains. As new ideas continue to develop to reflect the era and culture, it 
becomes evident that the toy is a product which has evolved along with humankind. It 
has become a marketable product which has blossomed into a multi-billion dollar 
industry.  
Electronic toys have gained popularity, consisting of electronic parts with embedded 
systems. In the past few decades, electronic toys such as Speak & Spell, Tamagotchi, and 
Furby had become popular. More recently, sensors, and networking capabilities have 
introduced a variety of new possibilities for the toy industry. Toy companies have 
embraced modern technologies such as mobile devices into the design of their 
products, reshaping the concept of toys and education [1] through mobile applications 
and augmented reality.  
Trends from Toy Fair 2014 indicated that the future of toys is augmented reality [2] [3], 
which uses technology to superimpose virtual world on top of reality. Augmented reality 
has also been noted to have a significant presence in the toy industry dating back to 
2012 [4]. These trends continued into Toy Fair 2015 with RCs that interact with 
smartphones, apps that allow children to play with toys in new and different ways, 
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augmented reality and wearables [5]. Electronic toys have evolved to become more 
interactive and personalized to the individual user’s preferences and environment by 
providing services which react to sensing technologies, and can create an augmented 
reality experience. The NPD’s 2013 review of the Global Toy Market [6] identified the 
toy category of youth electronics as the most prominent subcategory of toys in terms of 
growth in the U.S. and Europe. This was also a trend identified at Toy Fair 2015 [5]. 
Further, Euromonitor International’s research from 2015 [7] indicates that phenomenal 
growth in smartphones and tablets stimulate digital gaming, while electronic toys such 
as children’s tablets and cross-platform toys such as amiibo have been a growing trend. 
In the U.S., the toy industry generates approximately $22 billion in annual retail toy 
sales, while the total economic impact of the toy industry in the U.S. is over $75 billion 
as of January 2015 [8]. Many countries have safety standards and regulations limiting 
the types of toys that can be sold on the market in order to protect the safety and 
privacy of customers.  
Toy computing is a recently developing concept which transcends the traditional toy 
into a new area of computer research using mobile technologies. A toy in this context 
can be effectively considered a computing device or peripheral. Toy computing is 
comprised of two main topics in computer science: physical computing, and mobile 
services. Physical computing builds upon the traditional idea of the toy by bestowing it 
with potential embedded systems and sensory devices to create a more reactive and 
pervasive experience. Mobile devices act as the primary computing device and may also 
use sensors, while hosting mobile applications and services which complement the 
physical device. Physical computing combined with mobile services can create an 
augmented reality environment for toy computing through which users can immerse 
themselves in the toy computing experience. Augmented reality is the result of 
overlaying virtual components which react to real-world triggers captured through 
cameras and/or other sensors. This is achieved through the combination of physical 
computing with mobile services. 
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The toy may be endowed with sensory and/or networking capabilities, allowing for new 
opportunities for personalized services based on user preferences and environment. 
This introduces a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) approach. One of the key 
concepts with this type of personalized services is contextual data. The application is 
able to gather data on the context of the user (e.g. time of day, location, weather) and 
provide personalized services based on this context data.  
In modern times, with the proliferation of personal mobile devices such as smartphones 
and tablets, many service-oriented distributions have taken on a “bring-your-own-
device” (BYOD) model. BYOD is an emerging application distribution model that 
encourages users to use their own mobile devices to access various online and mobile 
services. BYOD is being adopted by many traditional consumer electronics products such 
as electrical appliances and toys. Many studies found out that the traditional services 
enforcement mechanisms cannot cope with the complex security requirements of the 
emerging BYOD paradigm because the mobile devices are outside the infrastructure’s 
scope and control [9] [10]. Moreover, the mobile devices may run third-party services 
that could, intentionally or unintentionally, violate the safety policy. Most of the related 
solutions provide a mobile device management service that can block or even reset 
devices violating the security policy based on blacklist or whitelist approaches in place 
without advanced behavioral analysis such as motion sensing data in the mobile device. 
Some toys have become integrated into mobile devices, using apps, sensors and Near-
field Communication (NFC). This introduces issues with trust which did not previously 
exist with traditional electronic toys, which operated on their own trusted platform. 
With the BYOD model comes additional concerns for privacy controls due to the 
introduction of an untrusted mobile device intended as the primary trusted system.  
While toys become increasingly integrated with mobile devices, they also take on the 
privacy and security risks of such devices. Data that is collected to personalize the 
experience is also sensitive data that needs to be kept private from unwanted third 
parties. Information privacy is of great concern to many users who are becoming 
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increasingly worried about how their personal data is being collected and managed. 
Location data is particularly sensitive, as it can be used to infer a significant amount of 
private information about a user, such as movement and lifestyle patterns, workplace, 
etc. One of the major areas where toy computing differs from other types of mobile 
services is the user base. While users are primarily children or teenagers, privacy and 
security is an especially high priority. It is important to keep in mind the specific privacy 
concerns, laws and regulations for these users.  
Privacy policies are a way of communicating to end users how their data is collected, 
managed, shared, and retained. However, the issue of policy enforcement remains an 
issue here. There is currently no standard framework in place for developers to follow 
for privacy preservation of mobile toy applications. This thesis aims to address this issue 
by introducing a formal access control framework for privacy preservation for mobile 
toy applications, with a focus particularly on location privacy. The framework is designed 
to allow users to define their own privacy preferences which will then be compared to a 
service’s privacy policy before it is permitted access to their sensitive data. We provide a 
formal model for defining location, which we have adapted into an extended eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [11] vocabulary with extended entities for 
defining location privacy specifications.  
1.2 Motivation for Privacy 
Although toy computing inherits the laws and regulations of its components, there is a 
unique need for this research particularly in the area of toy computing. While many of 
the same ideas can be adapted to other non-toy areas such as wearable devices, or even 
smartphone apps that use location-based services, this thesis focuses on the perspective 
of toy computing. Toy computing has unique requirements, including specific needs for 
children, as well as the relationship between the child, app, and physical toy 
component. There is no legislation or industry standard which specifically regulates 
privacy for toy computing. As a result, it is difficult for toy companies to have a basis for 
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how to best protect the privacy of users. From the consumer perspective, it also is a 
challenge for parents to manage the privacy of their children.  
While the use of toy computing provides a unique source of entertainment, allowing 
children to express themselves, connect and communicate with their family and friends, 
there are several factors that contribute to the unique requirements for privacy in toy 
computing. The first factor is the user base, children under the age of 13. The personal 
data of children is widely considered to be especially sensitive and should be treated 
with extreme care [12] [13] to ensure their safety. Toy computing inherits the online 
safety threats of traditional online services which children can be vulnerable to including 
harassment, stalking, grooming1, sexual abuse or exploitation, or personal data misuse 
[14]. Sexual solicitation and internet-initiated offline encounters are a major issue for 
the online safety of children [15]. The U.S. Department of Justice [16] indicates that “1 
in 25 youths received an online sexual solicitation in which the solicitor tried to make 
offline contact.” All of these risks are increased with the possibility of a potential 
solicitor becoming aware of the child’s location or historical location patterns. On the 
other hand, children also take up a large segment of the consumer population and are 
of particular interest to market researchers who may attempt to collect their personal 
data and usage patterns for targeted advertising [17]. Third party advertisers can infer a 
great amount of information about a child based on their location and other context 
information, collecting detailed behavioral profiles that may be used for unknown or 
unwanted purposes. 
Children are protected by international regulations such as the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [18], which protects children from all forms 
of violence, exploitation and abuse and discrimination, and ensures that the child’s best 
interest should be the primary consideration in any matters affecting them. Information 
privacy laws such as the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) [19] in Canada have been developed to protect the online privacy of users, 
                                                     
1
 ‘Grooming’ is a term which refers to the process by which an individual befriends and interacts with a 
child online in attempt to persuade them to perform sexual acts [9]. 
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including children. It is of great concern to parents that the toys and services which their 
children have access to comply with these privacy laws, for the safety and protection of 
their children. To our understanding, toy safety guidelines are out of date with the 
current innovations in toy technology. Toy safety guidelines such as Health Canada’s 
Safety Requirements for Children’s Toys and Related Products [20] concentrate on 
physical safety related to traditional toys and do not mention any restrictions related to 
privacy. These guidelines had been written to protect children’s safety with electronic 
toys, however they have not expanded with recent developments in toy technologies 
which now have a wide range of sensory and networking capabilities creating new 
privacy risks. The unique environment of toy computing has exposed a need for unique 
privacy considerations which we aim to address in this thesis. For the purpose of this 
thesis, we focus on protecting the privacy of location data for children using toy 
computing devices. Location data is one of the most prominent forms of context data, 
as a significant amount of personal information can be inferred based on it.  
1.2.1 Privacy Laws and Regulations 
Privacy protection laws define the rights of data subjects (users), the responsibilities of 
data collectors (service providers), and methods for dispute resolution. These laws are 
generally enforced through ombudsmen (e.g. Privacy Commissioner of Canada), or 
licensing bureaus (e.g. CNIL in France) [21]. Different countries and legislations have 
different laws for privacy protection. These laws can also differ depending on what type 
of information is being collected (e.g. health information), or who the users are (e.g. 
children under the age of 13).  
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documentation Act (PIPEDA) [19] is 
Canada’s national privacy law which governs how personal information can be collected, 
used, and disclosed in commercial business. PIPEDA is based on the 10 principles of the 
Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code for the Protection of Personal 
Information [22], which is recognized as a national standard in 1996. This model code is 
a representative of principles behind privacy legislation in many countries, including the 
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European Union. PIPEDA requires organizations to obtain consent when collecting, using 
or disclosing personal information, and to provide information regarding who is 
collecting the data, why it is being collected, and for what purpose it will be used. 
Personal information is defined in PIPEDA as “information about an identifiable 
individual, but does not include the name, title or business or telephone number of an 
employee of an organization.” PIPEDA also allows individuals the right to see and correct 
any personal information about them collected by companies. Under PIPEDA, personal 
information can be collected about as long as it is: 
 Gathered with the knowledge and consent of the person; 
 Collected for a reasonable purpose; 
 Used only for the reasons for which it was gathered; 
 Accurate and up to date; 
 Open for inspection and correction by the consumer; and 
 Stored securely. 
While PIPEDA requires meaningful consent for the collection of personal data collection, 
it does not refer to a particular age threshold for this. There is a difficulty in determining 
if a child is able to provide meaningful consent, as this greatly depends on their 
cognitive and emotional development and their understanding of privacy and online 
practices [12]. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has made the 
following recommendations regarding the management of the personal information of 
children and youth [12]: 
 “Children’s information is considered sensitive and merits special consideration 
under privacy laws.” 
 “Organizations should implement innovative ways of presenting privacy 
information to children and youth that take into account their cognitive and 
emotional development and life experience.” 
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The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) [23] which protects the online privacy of children under the age 
of 13. COPPA indicates that a child’s personal information cannot be collected without 
parental consent. In 2010, an amendment to COPPA further elaborated that personal 
information includes geolocation information, photographs, and videos. While Canada 
does not have an equivalent to COPPA, the OPC has indicated in the Online Behavioural 
Advertising Guidelines [24], a focus towards protecting children’s online privacy 
particularly in the region of online behavioural targeted advertisements. The OPC 
recommends for organizations to avoid knowingly tracking children and Web sites 
aimed at children.  
While technology continues to change, there are limitations on privacy laws and many 
countries and states struggle to keep up with the changing environment. Privacy related 
to location information, child users, and responsible marketing to children have been 
emerging topics in recent years. In order to help regulate this, several regulating 
organizations have provided guidelines and recommendations for industry self-
regulation of the management of children’s data online and mobile environments. The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) have released guidelines for child online protection, stressing that companies 
in states which lack adequate legal frameworks for the protection of children’s rights to 
privacy and freedom of expression should follow enhanced due diligence to ensure 
policies and practices are in line with international law [13]. The guidelines encourage 
companies to adopt the highest privacy standards when it comes to collecting, 
processing and storing data from or about children [13]. Further, services directed at or 
likely to attract a main audience of children must consider the risks posed to them by 
access to, or collection and use of, personal information (including location 
information), and ensure those risks are properly addressed [13].  
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1.3 Toy Computing Model 
Toy computing is a configuration where the physical toy component interacts with a 
mobile device which connects to one or more mobile services to facilitate gameplay. 
Figure 1.1 presents a model of the toy computing environment for the purpose of this 
thesis. This model illustrates the interactions between the physical toy component and 
the mobile device, as well as the interaction between the mobile service and the mobile 
platform when the mobile service attempts to access location data resources. In this 
model we have three entities: the physical toy component, the mobile device 
(platform), and the mobile service.  
The physical toy component is an item much like a traditional toy, and can take the form 
of anything such as a doll, block, ball, or blaster. The toy interacts with the mobile 
device through one or more types of interactions. The types of interactions a toy can 
have with the mobile device include physical interaction by touching a button or screen, 
visual interaction as detected through a camera on the mobile device, audible 
interaction as detected through a microphone on the mobile device, or through network 
interactions such as Bluetooth, RFID or Wi-Fi. The physical toy component may also 
have sensors which collect and send sensory data to the mobile device.  
The mobile component of the model includes the mobile platform, location resources, 
and the mobile service. The mobile platform facilitates access restrictions between the 
mobile service and the resources located on the mobile device. Location data is often 
used by mobile services to provide relevant location-based services to a user. In a toy 
computing environment, location data can be used to locate other players. Location 
data is in the form of Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, latitude and 
longitude, to indicate the physical location of the device. Location accuracy can be 
expressed as fine or coarse, depending on the method it is collected.  
This model incorporates the BYOD Walled Garden concept as outlined by the 
Whitehouse [25], to contain data or application processing within a secure application 
on the personal device so that it is segregated from personal data. As depicted in Figure 
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1.1, the mobile service is within a Walled Garden. A Walled Garden in a BYOD 
environment provides a trusted platform which can make access control decisions based 
on policies.  
 
Figure 1.1 Toy Computing Environment 
Referring to the three types of context data as defined by the World Economic Forum 
[26] (further described in Chapter 2), context data can be volunteered, observed, or 
inferred. During the course of the interactions between the toy and the mobile device, 
we are concerned with preserving the privacy of observed location data. Location data is 
observed as it is not explicitly provided by the user, but rather it is detected through the 
GPS sensors located on the mobile device. Figure 1.2 shows a GPS location (latitude and 
longitude) on a mobile device using the popular application Google Maps. Location data 
will be represented through latitude and longitude, and time. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 GPS location on a mobile device using Google Maps. Adapted from play.google.com 
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For the purpose of this thesis, a session is the duration of a game. The duration of a 
game starts with the interaction of the toy with the mobile device. The access to the 
location resources will be determined when the game starts, and end when the game 
finishes. Figure 1.3 depicts the concept of a session between a user and the toy 
computing system, comprised of the physical toy, and a mobile device running a mobile 
service. 
 
Figure 1.3 User and Toy Computing System 
1.4 Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
1. To define the concept of toy computing as an emerging research area. 
2. To identify the unique location privacy requirements for toy computing. 
3. To present a privacy access control model for location data in toy computing. 
4. To present a novel technical framework for preserving location privacy in toy 
computing, including: 
 An extended XACML vocabulary for location privacy. 
 Technical framework to enforce the policies. 
 Prototyping and case studies for proof of concept. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into six main chapters. This first chapter provides an introduction 
to the thesis, with an overview of the content and motivation. This is expanded upon in 
Chapter 2 with a comprehensive background on toy computing and related topics 
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including physical computing and mobile services technologies. Chapter 2 includes a 
discussion of some current toy computing products on the market, as well as a technical 
background on related technologies, an overview of access control and privacy concepts 
and a discussion of related works in this research area.  
Chapter 3 establishes the privacy requirements for location data in a mobile toy 
computing environment. This chapter uses privacy threat modeling techniques and 
investigates current laws and regulations which apply to this context, particularly 
related to users who are children and their parents who wish to employ privacy controls 
to protect their privacy. From these requirements we present six privacy constraints. 
Based on the privacy requirements outlined in the preceding chapter, Chapter 4 
presents a privacy access control model for location data in toy computing. In this 
chapter we adapt core access control techniques and combine them with privacy-based 
entities. We define how the model addresses the six constraints based on the privacy 
requirements outlined in Chapter 3, and present an algorithm for access control 
decisions for privacy enforcement. 
Chapter 5 establishes a novel location privacy enforcement framework for toy 
computing. This chapter presents an extended XACML vocabulary for location privacy 
adapted from the access control model in Chapter 4. The chapter defines the 
framework’s request and response process, and algorithms for policy decisions. This 
chapter also presents a prototype implementation of the framework to enforce privacy 
preferences of the user, and includes case studies as proof of concept. Lastly, the thesis 
is concluded in Chapter 6 with some discussion on limitations, potential future works, 
and some concluding remarks. 
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  Background Chapter 2
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background on the fundamental concepts of 
Toy Computing, including mobile services, physical computing, and augmented reality. It 
will also present some examples of toy computing products currently on the market. 
The chapter will also provide a background on security and privacy and relevant 
research works on these topics in order to provide the necessary foundations for the 
rest of the thesis. 
2.1 Toy Computing Background 
2.1.1 What is Toy Computing? 
Mobile devices have become prevalent in many aspects of our daily lives. The reason for 
this is the portability and flexibility of the devices which can easily support applications 
developed for a wide range of uses. More recently, another use for mobile devices has 
been introduced in the area of toys and gaming. Toy companies such as Hasbro, Mattel, 
and Tech4Kids have released toys that integrate with mobile platforms, providing new 
capabilities and add-ons to traditional functionality [27]. These have been referred to as 
Augmented [28], Interactive [29], or Smart Toys [30], because they include sensory 
capabilities to allow them to detect and interact with their environment. Related fields 
include physical computing, mobile services, context and location-based services, and 
augmented reality. At its most basic level, a toy computing system can be identified as a 
toy equipped with sensory technology, mobile computing power, and communication 
capabilities [28]. This differs from a traditional electronic toy in how it incorporates a 
mobile component, whereas traditional electronic toys are isolated to their own 
proprietary platform. For the purpose of this thesis, the two basic components that 
make up a toy computing system include a) the physical component, which is similar to 
a traditional toy, and b) the mobile component, a smartphone or tablet running an 
application to provide services to the user/toy.  
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The physical component of a toy computing system observes almost the same overall 
characteristics as a traditional toy, with the potential addition of embedded systems, 
networking capabilities or sensors designed to communicate in some way with the 
mobile component. This physical component can take the form of any traditional toy, 
such as a blaster [31], block [32], or stuffed animal [33]. The physical component may or 
may not contain embedded systems or networking capabilities; however it must be able 
to interact in some way with the mobile component. An interaction can be physical, 
visual, auditory, or through networking such as Bluetooth, RFID or Wi-Fi.  
In this configuration, the mobile device takes on the position as the primary computing 
device of the system. This includes the CPU, memory, sensory input, and output. The 
mobile component will run an application which operates in collaboration with the 
physical component to provide services to the user based on their interactions with the 
physical component. For the purpose of this thesis, we will be concentrating on Toy 
Computing from a mobile services perspective. There is a multitude of built-in sensory 
capabilities on mobile devices, which provide a new wave of opportunities for human 
computer interaction and personalized context-aware services. Depending on the toy, 
the sensory capabilities may either be located on the physical component, the mobile 
component, or both. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between physical computing 
and mobile services to form a toy computing environment.  
 











•Virtual world over 
reality 
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2.1.1.1 Examples of Toy Computing Products 
Toy computing is quickly gaining popularity in the toy industry. These toys have a wide 
variety of categories including toy blasters, language blocks for educational purposes, 
and methods of communication for children. Below are some examples of popular toy 
computing products currently on the market.  
Tek Recon 
 
Tek Tecon [31] is a line of toy blasters developed by Tech4Kids, marketed to children 
aged 8 years and up in 2013. While this product features a physical component identical 
in concept to a traditional toy blaster, the novelty is the ability to integrate with a 
mobile device. Referring to Figure 2.2, the Tek Recon blaster features a mount on top 
where a smartphone is inserted. A mobile application has been developed by Tech4Kids 
which operates in collaboration with the physical blaster to augment traditional blaster-
based games. The application provides several functionalities including a scope, which 
uses the smartphone camera to display what is in front of the user with additional 
features overlaid on top, such as ammunition, score, radio, and a GPS location map of 
other players. The application has networking functionality to create and join games 
with friends over a LAN or mobile network. The user is also required to create an 
account online, where the scores and account information are stored.  
Figure 2.2 Tek Recon "Havoc" blaster with mobile device mount. Adapted from 
www.tekrecon.com 
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Another recent toy computing product in the industry is Sphero [34], first introduced in 
2011 by Orbotix, which then released subsequent versions, Sphero 2.0 in 2013 and 
Sphero Ollie in 2014. Referring to Figure 2.3, Sphero is a robotic ball which can be 
controlled and programmed through the user’s smartphone or tablet. There are over 30 
apps available for Sphero, most of which are games, while others are focused on 
education. This product is marketed not only to children and can be appropriate for any 
age group. While the physical ball component is a very simple and traditional concept, 
the capabilities of the toy increase substantially with the inclusion of robotics and a 
mobile device. The Sphero ball has wireless networking capabilities, an accelerometer 
and gyroscope, rolls in every direction, and glows different colors. Sphero can be 
programmed by the user through an app called Sphero Macrolab, which includes a set 
of predefined macros, and more advanced users can use another app called orbBasic to 
program in a language based on BASIC. 
Figure 2.3 Sphero robotic ball. Adapted from www.thinkgeek.com 
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ChineseCUBES [32] is a toy computing product first introduced in 2011 which combines 
augmented reality technology with physical blocks to help the user to learn Chinese 
characters. Referring to Figure 2.4, the AR markers on the cubes are arranged in a 
certain order and detected by the webcam to create an interactive audio/visual 
experience with the software on the computer or mobile device. The software includes 
multiple features such as interactive stories, lessons and videos. The compute or mobile 
device does all of the sensing and processing in this scenario, and the physical cube 
components are entirely traditional. 
Toy Mail  
 
 
Toy Mail [35] is a toy introduced in 2013 which can connect to the user’s home WiFi 
network and interact with the free Toy Mail mobile app. Once the app is installed on a 
mobile device, the user can record a message which will be sent to the toy. When a 
Figure 2.4 ChineseCUBES. Adapted from www.chinesecubes.com 
Figure 2.5 Toy Mail character, "Snort.” Adapted from www.toymail.co 
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message is received, the toy (as shown in Figure 2.5) will make a snort, wheeze, or 
whine sound to let the user know that they have received a message, which can then be 
played and replied to.  
Other 
Toy computing has been also been developed for a wide range of purposes such as 
language learning [36], early childhood education, and for children with ADHD and 
autism. For example, Auti is a socially assistive robotic toy which encourages physical 
and verbal interactions in children with autism [37]. Educational toys such as roBlocks 
and SmartTile encourage children to learn about robotics and programming while they 
play [38]. There has also been research on monitoring children’s developmental 
progress using augmented toys and activity recognition [39]. 
2.1.1.2 Design Guidelines for Toy Computing 
Hinske et al. [40] provide a Summary of Design Guidelines for Integrating Pervasive 
Computing Technology into (Traditional) Toys: 
1. The technological enhancement must have an added value. 
2. Specify what actions/tasks are to be supported. 
3. Let the focus remain on the toy and the interaction itself, not the technology. 
4. Integrate the technology in such a way that it is unobtrusive, if not completely 
invisible. 
5. Toys should be still usable (in the “traditional” way) even if the technology is 
switched off or not working. 
6. Tightly intertwine design and implementation  
7. The technology should be reliable, durable, and safe. 
8. Offer immediate and continuous feedback. 
9. The added technology should support the high dynamics of play environments. 
10. Employ an iterative development process, including rapid prototyping and 
testing. 
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The above guidelines reinforce that the integration of pervasive computing technology 
(i.e. in the context of toy computing) should provide added value and seamless 
integration with the physical toy component. Further, the technology should be reliable, 
durable, and safe. From the perspective of privacy, this introduces a need for a privacy 
preserving framework which protects the child from privacy threats while not taking 
away from the play experience by introducing obtrusive policies.  
2.1.2 Physical Computing 
Physical computing is a branch of computing which involves the integration of 
computing technology into a physical device which interacts with its environment. This 
is similar to the concept pervasive or ubiquitous computing, in which the computing 
device establishes itself into the users’ daily physical activities. A pervasive computing 
environment is an information-enhanced physical space, not a virtual environment that 
exists to store and run software [41]; where the design of the system takes a human 
body as a given, and attempt to design within the limits of its expression [42].  
The distinction between physical and pervasive computing is that physical computing 
has more of a focus on the physical objects involved rather than completely seamless 
interaction. In toy computing the physical toy component is an active part of the user 
experience, whereas in pervasive computing there would be little to no physical 
component and the system works seamlessly with everyday activities. One of the main 
characteristics of both pervasive and physical computing devices is its ability to perceive 
context information on the surrounding environment in order to react accordingly [41]. 
This perception is done through sensors on the device such as a microphone, camera, or 
accelerometer. Perception of this context information is fundamental to the device’s 
ability to make timely and context-sensitive decisions.  
As mentioned previously, the physical component of the toy computing environment 
would be the traditional toy itself, which will be complemented with embedded systems 
or sensor technology which communicates with the mobile application. In this system, 
personalized services are provided to the user based on context data collected and 
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inferred through sensors and other environment data. With the pervasiveness of 
modern mobile devices, vast amounts of information can be collected and inferred 
about the user and their environment. Physical computing often involves a networked 
environment, which introduces privacy and security issues, particularly related to the 
context information the devices are processing. While the toy is the physical component 
in this system, the mobile device is what provides computing functionality and sensory 
perception, as described in the next section. 
 
Physical computing introduces physical objects as interface components. The examples 
in the previous section demonstrate this with a toy blaster, ball, and cubes, which are all 
used as an interface similar to a traditional toy, but with enhanced interactive 
capabilities. As seen in Figure 2.6, the Sphero robotic ball acts as the physical interface 
component in a physical, toy computing environment.  
2.1.2.1 Sensors 
Modern mobile devices are created with a variety of sensory capabilities. In a toy 
computing environment, developers may embed sensors into the physical toy 
component, or take advantage of sensors already built into the mobile device. Through 
these sensors, motion and other data can be detected in a number of ways. Sensors can 
be categorized into three different types: motion sensors, position sensors, and 
Figure 2.6 Sphero robotic ball as a physical toy component. Adapted from www.gosphero.com 
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environment sensors [43]. Below is an analysis on some of the different types of data 
that can be gathered from these sensors. 
 Motion Sensors: Motions sensors capture the physical motions of a device. Mobile 
devices can include a number of sensors for measuring motion including an 
accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, barometer, gravity, linear acceleration, 
and rotation vector. Motion is commonly represented through 6- or 9-axis sensor 
system (3-axis magnetometer, 3-axis gyroscope, 3-axis accelerometer). These types 
of sensors are commonly used for a variety of mobile applications such as games, as 
a way for the user to interact with the application (e.g. angling the device left or 
right to turn the character in a game). They have also been commonly used in fitness 
applications for tracking steps and calories lost during a walk, run, or jog. A popular 
example of this is Zombies, Run! [44], a mobile game application which takes motion 
sensor input while a user is running or jogging. The application provides missions for 
the user to complete by meeting certain fitness goals which correlate with the 
storyline.  
 Position Sensors: Position sensors are also very popular in mobile systems. Some 
examples of these types of sensors include geomagnetic field sensor, proximity 
sensor, and GPS. Position sensors, particularly proximity and GPS, are very useful for 
mobile and toy computing due to the portability of mobile devices. Many 
applications use location-based services which use position sensors on the device to 
provide recommendations relevant to the location of the user. Some examples of 
this include Yelp [45], UrbanSpoon [46], which allow users to read and post reviews 
of nearby restaurants and other establishments. Other applications such as social 
media applications, Instagram [47] and Facebook [48], use position sensors to allow 
users to geotag their location along with their posts.     
 Environment Sensors: Sometimes it is useful for an application to be able to detect 
data about the surrounding environment. While this is not used as widely as motion 
and position sensors in the mobile and toy computing environment, these sensors 
do have a lot of very useful applications in agriculture, health care, security systems, 
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aeronautics. Types of environment sensors include sensors for relative ambient 
humidity, luminance, ambient pressure, and ambient temperature. The most 
popular environment sensors in the context of a mobile environment are probably 
luminance and sound sensors. An example of an application that uses environment 
sensors is PressureNet [49], an Android application that measures atmospheric 
pressure using the atmospheric sensors built into most Android phones. Most 
smartphones use luminance sensors to adjust screen brightness based on lighting 
conditions.  
2.1.2.2 Wireless Communication Technologies 
While physical computing environment collects environment data through sensors, the 
data collected often needs to be communicated to a service provider or other devices 
over a wireless network. The service provider may be located on the user’s mobile 
device, or another device on the local or wide-area network. Possible types of wireless 
communication technologies used in a mobile toy computing environment include: 
RFID, NFC, Bluetooth, WiFi, GSM, and UMTS/3GSM. 
2.1.3 Context Data 
Data observed and collected through sensors gather context on the user and their 
environment. Context is defined succinctly by Dey and Abowd [50] as “any information 
that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity.” Schilit et al. [51] defined 
context as location, identities of nearby people and objects, and changes to those 
objects. Zimmermann et al. further categorized the elements for describing context 
information into five categories: individuality, activity, location, time, and relations. 
Individuality is personal information about a user, activity is data regarding physical 
activity, location is the GPS location, time is discrete time, and relations are inferences 
between two or more pieces of context data. In a context-aware system, services are 
provided to the user based on what is relevant to their context. Recent advances in 
mobile technology open up great opportunity for the collection and processing of 
context data in valuable ways. There are many types of private context data that can be 
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collected via a mobile application. The collection of this data allows applications to 
adapt to the user’s environment and personalize services accordingly.  
2.1.3.1 Types of Context Data 
Mobile devices can capture a user’s physical activity state (e.g. walking, standing, 
running, etc.) and store personalized information (e.g. location, activity patterns, etc.). 
This data is referred to as context data; data that is collected on the user and their 
environment. This data can be collected from sensors, provided explicitly by the user, or 
observed, such as the time of an event. Personal data can come in many forms including 
browsing history, friends list, and location information. Some other examples of relevant 
context information include [52]: Verbal context, roles of communication partners, goals 
of the communication/individuals, local environment, social environment (who is there), 
and physical and chemical environment. Information can be volunteered (e.g. profile 
data provided directly by the user) or observed (e.g. location data detected from GPS). 
Often, private information may seem trivial and not perceived as very sensitive to the 
user, while in practice it can actually reveal a large amount of personal information 
about them. The World Economic Forum [26] defines three types of context data, as 
categorized by the way it is collected: volunteered, observed, and inferred: 
 Volunteered Data: data that is explicitly provided by the user. This can include 
personal profile information or preference settings.  
 Observed Data: data not directly given by the user, but is detected by the 
device/application often through a sensor. Some examples of observed data include 
GPS location and time. 
 Inferred Data: data deduced based on analysis of a combination of volunteered 
and/or observed data (e.g. where a user is likely to be going based on typical 
behavior). A lot can be interpreted on a user and their environment through 
inferences based on collected data. There is great value on this inferred data that 
would not be explicitly provided by the user. 
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Volunteered and observed data can be analyzed to infer significant amounts of personal 
information about the user. For example, forecasting trip destinations based on data 
from driving habits [53]. Collected data is the basis for many valuable context-aware 
services, which provide custom content or services to the user based on what is most 
likely to be useful to them. 
2.1.3.2 Privacy Concerns 
With all of this in mind, privacy is a growing concern among many users of mobile 
devices. While many users appreciate the value of targeted services, they still express 
concern over how their data is collected and managed without their knowledge. 
Cherubini et al. [54] identify privacy as a barrier to the adoption of mobile phone 
context services. 70% of consumers say it is important to know exactly what personal 
information is being collected and shared [55], while 92% of users expressed concern 
about applications collecting personal information without their consent [56]. Mobile 
applications have adapted countless services to better analyze context data and provide 
custom services that will bring the most value to a user based on what they are most 
likely to need.  
While allowing context data to be collected for services can prove to be of great benefit 
to users, there is an ongoing tradeoff between utility and privacy [57]. In this physical 
mobile and pervasive environment, the timely delivery of services is fundamental. The 
amount of information collected often results in a tradeoff required between disclosing 
sensitive data and receiving context-aware services. In order to provide the most 
relevant services to the user, more personal and context information must be collected, 
which raises concerns of privacy. For example, a service can send special promotions 
and coupons to a user depending on what is most relevant to them. In order to provide 
the most relevant promotions, the service will need to collect certain context data such 
as their location, and also potential profile information such as age and gender to help 
to determine what their interests may be based on demographic. To gain even more 
context of the user, the application may collect and retain historical data on the user 
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such as previous movement patterns, to determine where they are likely to be at certain 
times, if they are travelling, or previous interactions with the application such as which 
promotions they had previously been interested in. In this example, it is clear that the 
more information is collected on the user, the more relevant services can be provided to 
them. However, the user may not be comfortable with the level of data that is collected 
and inferred on them. An application knowing where you are and what you are likely to 
be doing at any given time is likely to raise concern with users.  
For this reason, context data is at the core of privacy concerns with many mobile 
applications. Privacy goals must be defined to ensure private data is managed 
responsibly. Further, detailed analysis is required to ensure that the user’s sensitive 
behavior cannot be inferred based on collected data. There have been many solutions 
which aim to preserve the privacy of sensitive context data, as will be described further 
below. There are countless types of data that can be collected from a mobile device that 
must be considered when evaluating the scope of privacy. This is true of collected 
sensory data as described above, and also from within other applications, sensitive data 
can be collected such as a user’s profile information, contact list, or calendar. All of this 
information can be collected and analyzed to determine context information about the 
user.  
2.1.3.3 Location 
Location data can be defined as data representing where a user is physically located. 
Location is one of the most prominent types of data for context-based services, existing 
as a key parameter to define context [58]. A user’s location, combined with other 
context and historical data, can be used to infer an extensive amount of information 
including actions, speed, direction, and movement patterns. Location data can be 
collected from the device through GPS, WiFi, or mobile network satellite. It can also be 
inferred from other information such as IP address, although this can be inaccurate (e.g. 
in the case of a proxy).  
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Location is defined succinctly by Merriam-Webster [59] as “a place or position.” This 
definition has been extended by the National Geographic Encyclopedia [60] to establish 
three different types of representing location: absolute location, relative location, and 
type of location as follows: 
 Absolute Location – the location expressed in a range or exact GPS coordinates of 
latitude and longitude. The absolute location can be expressed as coarse or fine; for 
example, an entire country, city, block, or exact coordinates. 
 Relative Location – the location relative to another entity as a reference point; for 
example, a relative location can be expressed as the distance between User A and 
User B, or distance between User A and Device C, or User A and location D.  
 Type of location – the location expressed in an assigned category. Some examples of 
this could be home, office, street, mall, or restaurant.  
Generally, location is represented as a 3-dimensional vector of GPS coordinates 
(latitude, longitude), and altitude (optional). A location event also includes a timestamp. 
Android’s GpsLocation data structure represents the location of the device with the 










Different ways of collecting location information can be more accurate than others. For 
example, there is GPS-based location (fine) or Network-based location (coarse) [61]:   
 ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION (Network-based) – allows and app to access 
approximate location derived only from network location sources (cell towers and 
Wi-Fi). This method varies in accuracy from 50 metres in urban areas, and several 
kilometres in rural areas with less cell tower coverage. 
 ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION  (GPS-based) – allows and app to access precise location 
from location sources such as cell towers and WiFi, and also the user’s GPS 
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coordinates provided from their device. Accuracy for fine location using GPS is fairly 
accurate from 2-20 metres. 
While a huge number of mobile applications request access to user location data, this is 
one of the most sensitive types of context-data. The incredible amount of information 
that can be gathered from a user based on their location is immense. Whalen et al. [62] 
discuss some of the current privacy issues in mobile devices mainly focusing on the 
storing and transmitting of sensitive location based information over extended periods. 
This research states that a large amount of users do not even know that such 
information is being stored, and in some cases, still happens even if the user has 
explicitly restricted such data to be collected. This goes against the privacy principle of 
having the users consent before collecting this information. Another violation of privacy 
principles that is discussed in this paper is the amount of data that is being collected is 
much more plentiful, accurate, and goes on for a lot longer than it needs to. One of the 
causes of this disconnect is that most of the permissions for this information collection 
is buried in lengthy policies that users rarely read, and is enabled by default. It is very 
important to protect this information, having access to such information not only shows 
where we have been but it can be used to predict where we will be tomorrow, and that 
introduces a lot more security concerns. Patil et al. [63] go into further detail about the 
widespread usage of location data collection in mobile services and their interaction 
with social networking services. The paper details an online study on 362 participants to 
understand the preferences of users of location services. The majority of users 
expressed that their main incentive for using of these services was for social networking 
purposes. A number of users in this study (25%) also indicated that they have regretted 
sharing their location on at least one occasion.  
Location privacy is a huge concern in the mobile and wireless environment. While it can 
appear trivial, location-based data can infer a lot of sensitive information about a user, 
including their activities, habits, interests, and personal relationships. Inference attacks 
are possible, such as knowing when a user will be somewhere based on movement 
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patterns and historical activity. This can potentially put a user at risk. Often, location-
aware services do not require knowledge of the exact location, but rather, could provide 
just as valuable services with an approximation of the user’s location [64].  
These research works identify a great need for location privacy management and 
enforcement in mobile services. While toy computing has become a recent 
development in the union of mobile service and toys, research on safety and privacy 
guidelines for toy computing seems to have been largely overlooked. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is a gap in the research area of location privacy in the context of toy 
computing. First, there is no formal model for enforcing privacy or location privacy in 
particular, for children using such toys.  
2.2 Mobile Services 
Mobile devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and e-readers, have become increasingly 
popular in recent years, successfully integrating themselves into the lives of many users. 
A recent poll of 5000 people by TIME magazine reveals that 54% of respondents check 
their mobile device at least once an hour [65], while another study for GSMA shows that 
68% of participants identified themselves as users of mobile internet/apps, with 38% of 
this subset considering themselves to be heavy users [56]. The immense popularity of 
these devices can be explained by their personal, portable, and pervasive nature. These 
characteristics create a unique platform for services, particularly those based on context 
data. Often, mobile devices will have one single primary user. The portability of a mobile 
device makes it possible for a user to carry it with them wherever they go, making it a 
highly personal device as well. Mobile devices are also designed to be easy and fast to 
use, and easily connect to networks, allowing the user to always stay connected to data 
and services.  
Mobile devices use mobile services, which are services accessible through a mobile 
network. Mobile services, like Web services, use Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as 
described in Section 2.2.3.1. Mobile services can be context-aware, gathering context 
information from the mobile device, and providing relevant personalized services based 
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on the context. To gather context information, a context-aware service can either listen 
for events sent by a context provider, or query the context provider. Gu et al. [66] 
propose a middleware for building context-aware mobile services, using a Service 
Locating Service to allow entities to locate different context providers. However, this 
model does not consider privacy preferences of the user.  
2.2.1 Mobile Games and Location-Based Services 
Location-based services, also known as location-aware mobile services, have become 
widely popular to provide information such as travel information, shopping, 
entertainment, and event information. Location-based services have been defined by 
Duri et al. [67] as “services in which the location of a person or an object is used to 
shape or focus the application or service.” Pura [68] identifies location as one of the 
most promising applications of mobile commerce, due to the ability to allow service 
providers to offer customized services based on context and resulting in increased 
perceived value and loyalty of customers.  
The mobile application industry has observed a widespread adoption of mobile game 
applications. This has been successful due to factors such as increased mobility and 
social network integration [69]. Location-based services have also been used in 
applications for games. The popular mobile game Angry Birds [70] has a location-based 
feature which allows users to compete with other based on a leader board associated 
with their location. MyTown [71] is another mobile game, reminiscent of Monopoly, 
where users can check in to a physical location, buy and sell properties, and collect rent 
from other players who check into the same location. 
Kaasinen [72] conducted a study to investigate user needs for location-aware mobile 
services: 
 Contents: topical up to date information, comprehensive relevant information, 
interaction (user is moving and can only provide limited interaction to device), push 
information based on both location and personalization, detailed search options, 
planning vs. spontaneity.  
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 Personalization: personal options and contents, user-generated content. 
 Seamless service entities: consistency, seamless solutions to support the whole user 
activity. 
 Privacy: the right to locate, use, store, and forward the location. Privacy 
requirements are based on legislation and social regulation. The paper also identifies 
P3P as a potential approach to manage user privacy preferences and compare them 
to the location-aware service’s privacy practices. 
2.2.2 Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
Mobile services follow Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) architecture, meaning that the 
user has their own personal mobile device to run the service from. Mobile services thus 
need to be flexible and consider a variety of different devices. While the term BYOD is 
typically used to refer to employees bringing personal devices to a work environment, 
the same general idea is involved in any mobile services scenario. Mobile applications 
must operate in a controlled environment and must protect data and resources from 
other untrusted applications that may be running on the device. Further, the 
introduction of unregulated mobile devices onto a network can result in loss of control, 
data leaks, and potential network loss [9]. BYOD can introduce complications when it 
comes to investigation in the case of a security breach. This can be made simpler 
through thorough planning of policies and contracts indicating employee and employer 
(or in a more general case, user and service provider) rights [10].   
A toy computing environment considers several properties of BYOD, although outside of 
a corporate environment. For the purpose of this thesis, we will be considering the 
following BYOD characteristics:  
 The user’s mobile device is untrusted. 
 The mobile application is operating on top of this untrusted device. 
The objective of BYOD is to isolate business applications from the rest of the system. 
This means isolation from other applications running on the personal device [73]. 
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2.2.3 Mobile Service Architecture 
Figure 2.7 illustrates a multi-layered model which illustrates the relationship between 
the conceptual, logical, and language layers of mobile services. This framework has been 
adapted from the Web services logical model presented by Hung et al. [74]. This model 
is an extension of traditional Service-Oriented Architecture to include layers for privacy-
related access control, and also an End-Point Device Profile for mobile devices. Each 
layer will be discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
Figure 2.7 Mapping between different models and layers. Adapted from [74]. 
2.2.3.1 Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
A theoretical model for Web services has been defined in Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA). In our conceptual model, SOA consists of the message layer, service layer, and 
discovery layer. W3C defines SOA as a form of distributed systems architecture which 
typically maintains the following six properties [75]: (1) The architecture is defined in a 
logical view, in terms of what it does. (2) The message orientation property expresses 
how the service is defined in terms of the messages exchanged between provider and 
requester agents, rather than the internal architecture behind the provider’s services. 
(3) Description orientation enforces that a service is described by machine-processable 
metadata. (4) SOA messages are also granular and (5) Platform neutral, meaning 
services tend to use a small number of operations with large and complex messages, 
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which are in a standardized platform-neutral format (ex. XML). Lastly, these services 
often tend to be oriented towards use over a network.  
As seen in Figure 2.8, SOA consists of three entities: service provider, service requester, 
and service broker, and 3 operations: publish, find, and bind.  
 Discovery Layer (publish): In the model, the service provider will first “publish” 
details of its service (description and location) to the service broker, who saves it to 
the Universal Description Discovery Integration (UDDI) registry. UDDI is an OASIS 
standard which provides a directory of services available from each service provider. 
 Service Layer (find): The service requester queries the service broker with the “find” 
operation to find the service it is looking for, who will then return the details of the 
service. This layer uses Web Services Description Language (WSDL), an XML-based 
W3C standard for describing network services as a set of endpoints operating on 
messages [76]. 
 Message Layer (bind): Finally, the requester uses the connection details to “bind” to 
the provider and receive services. The message layer uses Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP), an XML-based protocol for request and response messages in web 
services. 
 
Figure 2.8 Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) 
SOA is also been explored with mobile devices, with the mobile host acting as a service 
provider. The authors of [77] discuss the mobile host as a provider of services with SOA. 
It overviews the limitations with WS standards specifications on mobile cloud deployed 
services, as well as provide an architecture for supporting mobile clients in this 
A Location Privacy Model and Framework for Mobile Toy Computing  
- 33 - 
 
environment. It has not been demonstrated in a real-life environment yet, although 
they are working on deploying it on Amazon EC2. Service-Oriented Architecture for 
Devices (SOA4D) [78] is an open-source initiative aimed at the development of service-
oriented software components (SOAP, WS-*, etc.) to fit the needs of embedded devices. 
SOA4D implements Device Profile for Web Service (DPWS), a specification designed for 
secure Web service communications on resource-constrained devices, as further 
described below.  
2.2.3.2 Device Profile for Web Services (DPWS) 
When software is running on any device, the application will need to communicate with 
other services whether they are internal or external (over a network). The Device Profile 
for Web Services (DPWS) [79] follows the SOA framework for automatic device and 
service discovery for networked embedded devices. DPWS offers a standardized device 
representation of services on a network and this allows for access to a set of built-in 
services such as secure accessing of metadata and exchange services by utilizing WS 
protocols. In other words, DPWS defines a minimal set of implementation constraints to 
enable secure Web service messaging, discovery, description, control, and eventing on 
resource-constrained endpoints [79]. The specification permits the definition of services 
for mobile devices considering the peer-to-peer direct communication between them 
that combine several devices as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). DPWS allows 
sending secure messages to and from services, dynamically discovering a service, 
describing a service, subscribing to, and receiving events from a service. 
In Web Services terms, a profile is a set of guidelines for how to use Web services 
technologies for a given purpose or application. Web services standards allow 
implementers to choose from a variety of message representations, text encodings, 
transport protocols, and other options, some of which are not interoperable. By 
constraining these decisions, profiles ensure that conforming implementations will work 
well together. DPWS is a profile developed by Microsoft and others for communication 
with and among networked devices and peripherals. The DPWS library for the .NET 
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Micro Framework is not a full Web services implementation but a lightweight subset 
with only the functionality needed to support DPWS on a device [80]. DPWS was built on 
the foundation of existing web services (WS) and as such uses many common 
specifications such as XML, SOAP, WS-*, WSDL and Message Transmission Optimization 
Mechanism (MTOM).  DPWS defines two main types of services that are run by devices: 
hosting services, and hosted services [80]. Devices can be DPWS clients (invoking hosted 
services on devices), servers (providing hosting services), or both. DPWS for the .NET 
Micro Framework supports devices in either role or both simultaneously. Hosted 
services are the services that the device has, and depends on their hosting service for 
discovery. Hosting services allow other devices to use, subscribe and obtain metadata of 
the given services. DPWS defines the extensions required for using services in mobile 
devices, taking in account their specific constraints. A DPWS enabled device has access 
to provided functionality such as: the discovery of other, utilizing WSDL to describe a 
Web service, service subscription, and secure sending of messages, given that the other 
device also utilizes DPWS.  
The Web Services for Devices (WS4D) [81] framework is an extension of DPWS to bring 
SOA and Web services technology to industrial automation, home entertainment, 
automotive systems and telecommunication systems. There have been ongoing 
initiatives to connect internet technologies and web services to resource-constrained 
devices in ad-hoc networks while conserving interoperability. WS4D provides 
technologies for easy setup and management of network-connected devices in 
distributed embedded systems [82]. Araujo and Siqueira [83] used WS4D to implement 
a DPWS Device Service Bus (DSB), establishing a Device Tunnel to deal with virtual 
devices and services.  
Pohlsen et al. [84] present a plug-and-play architecture for connecting medical devices 
through DPWS, using WS-Discovery protocol. Unlike traditional Web service 
architectures, the authors propose using a WS-Discovery proxy server rather than a 
UDDI server, to better meet the requirements of resource constrained devices. Further, 
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the work uses SOAP-over-UDP (User Datagram Protocol) for multicast messaging, as 
included in DPWS. El Kaed et al. [85] present an implementation to interoperably 
connect Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) and DPWS smart home devices such as a TV, 
printer, and light bulb. DPWS does not support fine-grained security requirements, 
direct authentication between devices without a third party, and does not propose a 
comprehensive authorization concept [86]. All of these works present the foundation 
technologies for this research work. To the best of our knowledge, there is no unified 
framework for enforcement for location privacy in mobile services for toy computing.  
2.3 Privacy and Access Control 
2.3.1 Introduction to Privacy  
When it comes to any information technology, privacy and security are at the core of 
ensuring that goals are achieved effectively and without compromise of personal data. 
The three concerns of security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Confidentiality means that access to information is restricted only to intended parties. 
Integrity means that data is accurate and consistent and has not been tampered with, 
while availability means that resources and data remain available when needed by the 
legitimate parties. A foundation of security is required for privacy.  
Information privacy is defined by Hung and Cheng [87] as “an individual’s right to 
determine how, when, and to what extent information about the self will be released to 
another person or to an organization.” In particular, personally identifiable information 
is any type of information that can be linked to an individual, including their activities, 
preferences, history, conversations, etc. In a mobile environment, personally 
identifiable information is also likely to be gathered from context data, as described in 
the previous section. Information privacy goals can be achieved through privacy 
preserving mechanisms such as access control, privacy policies, and privacy preferences.  
2.3.2 Walled Garden 
In a toy computing environment, the concern is with the privacy of the user and that 
access to resources that can reveal context data are limited to the toy/game service 
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application, and only used for purposes which comply with privacy regulations and are 
acceptable to the user. While the toy computing environment follows a BYOD model, it 
is required to identify a privacy preserving BYOD architecture. The Whitehouse has 
outlined three high-level means of implementing a BYOD program [25]:  
 Virtualization: Provide remote access to computing resources so that no data or 
corporate application processing is stored or conducted on the personal device; 
 Walled garden: Contain data or corporate application processing within a secure 
application on the personal device so that it is segregated from personal data; 
 Limited separation: Allow comingled corporate and personal data and/or 
application processing on the personal device with policies enacted to ensure 
minimum security controls are still satisfied. 
In this context, a virtualized model would not be feasible or able achieve the privacy 
goals in a toy computing environment. However, privacy and security can be protected 
in a toy computing environment through the Walled Garden or Limited Separation 
approach. Walled Garden is a sandboxed and separated model which allows for 
processing to take place within a secure application which is separate from other 
applications and data. Limited separation allows the personal and corporate data and 
processing to comingle together, but enacts policies to protect the data and resources. 
Limited separation approach raises the issue of having a trusted mechanism for policy 
enforcement. To our best knowledge, not many research works are discussing the 
concept of Walled Garden. 
2.3.3 Access Control 
Access control is a security and privacy concept which aims to protect access to 
resources or data. The purpose of access control is to limit the actions or operations 
that a legitimate user can perform [88]. There are two parts related to access control: 
the access decision, and the access enforcement. Access decisions can vary but the most 
basic are permit or deny. Access control decisions are made based on policies, for a 
variety of purposes. There are several different approaches to access control, including 
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Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [89], Role-
based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC). In a DAC 
model, access decisions are based on the identity of users and/or membership in certain 
groups. Data owners are responsible for determining the type of access available to 
their resources. In MAC, sensitivity labels are assigned to users and resources. In this 
model, users are granted or denied access based on their security clearance and the 
label associated with the resource. Further, RBAC determines access to resources/data 
based on the role of the subject. Attribute-based access control makes access decisions 
based on attributes associated with subjects and objects. Access control 
There are different types of policies which an access decision can be based on, e.g. 
privacy policies and security policies. Security policies are focused on maintaining 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of resources, while privacy policies are 
concerned with how and why data is used/shared/stored/etc. Privacy policies are the 
focus of access control decisions for the purpose of this work, and will be further 
described in the next section. 
2.3.4 Privacy Policies and Preferences 
Privacy policies describe an enterprise’s data practices. This includes a description of 
what information is collected from users, what the information will be used for, how 
long it will be held, if/how the information will be shared to third parties, how long the 
information will be retained, etc. Consent is given by the user either implicitly or 
explicitly. Often, consent is implied just by using the services. Explicit consent can be 
given if the user is required to click “I agree” in regards to the privacy policy terms and 
conditions in order to receive services. Privacy policies are used for a company to 
outline their privacy practices relating to collection, use, retention, and sharing 
practices. Privacy preferences allow the user to create a set of rules to express how they 
wish their information to be managed. 
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2.3.4.1 Human Readable Policies 
Privacy policies are often provided to their users in natural language. Mobile 
applications often provide privacy policies to their users in this format. The purpose of 
these privacy policies is to provide the user with the details on why and how their 
information is collected while they are using the mobile application. As an illustration, 
the following is the Furby Boom! App Privacy Policy, available online or through the app:  
Hasbro may collect non-personally identifiable information from devices that 
have installed a Hasbro app. This information is used to deliver services 
requested by users, such as content and updates within the app, as well as to 
support the internal operations of the app. For more information about the app, 
please contact us at http://hasbro-new.custhelp.com/ [90] 
This policy is available before installing the application, and provides the user with an 
idea of what type of information is collected, and what the purpose is for its collection. 
This human-readable privacy policy is short and in simple terms, however it does not 
provide any detail on what information is actually collected, or how exactly it is used.  
There are several concerns with how privacy policies are used in practice. In the case 
where a privacy policy is provided, the majority of users find them too complicated or 
long to read. Alternatively, as in the case of the Furby Boom! Privacy Policy, they can 
also be too vague. Human-readable privacy policies have a lot of limitations, some of 
which can be improved through the use of machine-readable policies. 
2.3.4.2 XML and Machine Readable Policies 
Structured policy languages allow for automated enforcement of privacy policies and 
access decisions. A privacy policy language supports access constraints (e.g. which 
subject can perform which action on which resource), as well as a description of access 
conditions. Policy languages must be platform independent, and able to integrate with 
the language used for access control policies [91]. Privacy policies can be expressed in 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [92] through policy assertion languages. XML is a 
flexible markup language used to describe data. XML is both human readable and 
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machine readable, and many APIs have been developed for processing XML data. 
Various languages and tools have been developed for the specification of privacy 
policies and preferences based on XML, including P3P, EPAL, XACML, and WS-policy.  
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 
Machine-readable privacy policy frameworks differ from human-readable ones. With 
machine-readable privacy policies, it allows the user to have more control over what 
information is collected and stored. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a privacy 
policy framework created by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), based on XML 
designed to help end users manage their privacy while navigating websites that have 
differing privacy policies. User’s privacy preferences are expressed using APPEL, A P3P 
Preference Exchange Language P3P also enables Websites to express their privacy 
practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily 
by users of P3P browsers [93]. P3P addresses user concerns about the type and number 
of data gathered by websites. At its most basic, any website that collects user 
information must clearly declare the reasons for the data collection, how it plans to use 
the information, and the amount of time it will retain the information. When using a 
P3P-compliant browser, cookies will be accepted, bypassed or denied depending on the 
previously mentioned user preferences. The user receives an alert when any privacy 
concerns arise and can override the previously set privacy level if they wish.  
While P3P was primarily designed for Web sites, it has been the focus of many future 
directions including Web services and mobile services. In [94], adaptation for the mobile 
environment is noted as a prominent future direction for P3P. Some major research 
questions are also addressed in this paper, including: how to create mobile-based 
privacy user agents that can communicate compact privacy policies of mobile web sites 
or applications to users, and how to delegate automatic access control privileges to 
mobile applications and websites based on user defined privacy preferences. Some 
concerns with moving P3P to the mobile environment, as outlined in [95], include 
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performance, security of the policies, extending P3P vocabulary for the mobile 
environment, and adapting the user interface for use on small mobile devices.  
The traditional approach to P3P has several shortfalls in terms of enforcement. [96] 
reiterates how P3P has not been strongly embraced in practice. Popular websites such 
as Google and Facebook have published P3P “compact policies” [97]. These policies 
state in human-readable code “this is not a P3P policy,” while in practice, the system 
interprets it as a valid policy. In these situations, websites are able to technically comply 
with requirements but do not provide any actual privacy enforcement. 
The authors of [21] performed an analysis on over 3000 P3P policies from 100,000 web 
sites to determine the relationship of privacy policies compared to legal requirements. 
The results of this study indicated that the surveyed website privacy policy statements 
had a widespread lack of adherence to legal mandates. Another report from the 
Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic [98] found similar results in a survey 
of 72 Canadian websites showing widespread noncompliance with PIPEDA. Many 
businesses are not taking necessary steps to preserve the privacy of their users. Another 
issue is faced by international web service companies (e.g. Google and Yahoo), who 
have difficulty with privacy regulation while they are required to address a multitude of 
different or conflicting international privacy laws and jurisdictions that must be 
negotiated [21]. 
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) 
EPAL [99] is another XML-based privacy policy language by W3C member IBM, designed 
to formalize internal privacy practices of an enterprise. EPAL is more suitable than P3P 
to express internal privacy policies that can be enforced by the enterprise’s privacy 
management system. EPAL allows an enterprise to define its own list of data categories, 
data users, purposes, and actions, whereas P3P is limited to a predefined list [100].  
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eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [11] is an OASIS standard for 
access control language and architecture. The policy language uses the XML standard to 
define the policy and access control decision request and response. When there is an 
access request, an authorization decision/response can then be made based on the 
policy. XACML supports both centralized and decentralized policy management. XACML 
architecture uses the IETF Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement, which is further 
described in Section 2.3.5.  
XACML specifies an abstract format for the authorization decision request as a 
description of the attempted resource access in terms of attributes [91]. An XACML 
attribute is associated with one of four classes: Subject, Resource, Action, and 
Environment. Subject is the entity who is sending the access request, Resource is the 
resource that is to be accessed, and Action is the action to be performed on the 
resource (e.g. read or write). The environment attribute describes an additional 
characteristic of the request such as time of day.  
The use of XACML has been widely adopted in Web services [91]. A comparison 
between EPAL and XACML by Anderson [91], has recommended XACML for its 
functionality and flexibility. Lastly, Geospatial eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (GeoXACML) [101] is an extension to XACML Version 2.0. by the Open 
Geospatial Consortium designed to control access to geospatial information. GeoXACML 
supports four types of functions: topological, geometric, bag & set, and conversion to 
manage geospacial information. 
2.3.5 Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement 
A privacy policy alone does not guarantee that the policies will actually be enforced. This 
brings us onto the Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement proposed by IETF 
(terminology [102], model [103]) and ISO [104]. This model has been used for policy 
enforcement for privacy policy languages such as EPAL and XACML.  
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Figure 2.9 IETF Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement. Adapted from [105]. 
Referring to Figure 2.9, access control decisions are made by the Policy Decision Point 
(PDP), and enforced by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). When an application 
requests access to a resource, it sends the request to the PEP, which forwards the 
request to the PDP. The PDP then retrieves the policies and attributes to determine if 
the request complies. The PDP will make a decision and send a Permit or Deny response 
back to the PEP. The PEP will enforce the decision accordingly, providing access to the 
resource if permitted.  
2.4 Related Works 
There exist a number of previous works in the fields of privacy, mobile services, and 
location-based services. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work exists which 
identifies a framework for privacy exclusively in the context of toy computing, and 
especially with a focus on location. Further, although there has been work on the topic, 
there exists no widely accepted framework for privacy for any type of mobile services. 
This section will provide the reader with an overview of existing literature related to 
these topics. 
2.4.1 Mobile and Web Services Privacy Frameworks 
Hung et al. [74] describe a vocabulary-independent privacy authorization language 
framework for Web services which addresses the privacy requirements (AC020) defined 
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in their Web Services Architecture (WSA) 
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Requirements [106]. The framework recommends domain-specific vocabularies to be 
developed for different types of business applications (e.g. finance, healthcare, etc.). 
The authors introduce a protocol for enforcing privacy policies, in which privacy policies 
are described in P3P, and preferences exchange rules in APPEL. The paper also considers 
the use of privacy authorization language in other Web services-related languages such 
as WS-Policy, WS-Security, and WS-Privacy.  
Access control is another area in which privacy is becoming more important. Traditional 
access control mechanisms such as discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory 
access control (MAC), and role based access control (RBAC) are not generally designed 
to accommodate privacy [107], however some recent RBAC extensions have been 
introduced with a privacy-focused objective [108]. Context- and location-based access 
control models have also been proposed [109], where certain services and data can only 
be accessed in a certain context/location. This is especially useful in a BYOD scenario 
where users wish to separate work from personal activities depending on their context. 
A lattice-based privacy aware access control (LPAAC) model is described in [110], in 
which data provider and collector privacy preferences are accommodated and enforced. 
This model allows the data collector to identify their privacy policies for purpose, 
visibility, granularity, and retention of data in terms of minimal acceptance limit (MinAL) 
and maximal acceptance limit (MaxAL). The data provider can then review the privacy 
policies and select their own preferences within the range, allowing them to receive 
services from the data collector while still being in control of their data. This paper also 
identifies the importance of enforcement, and provides an algorithm based on the 
above for determining the access decision to be enforced by the system it is being 
implemented on. The authors have also implemented their model using P3P [111].  
ipShield, introduced by [57], is a privacy-aware framework designed to quantify an 
adversary’s knowledge regarding the user’s context and obscure it before sharing. This 
framework does not depend on the user being anonymous, but instead focuses on 
choosing which data to share. It identifies several information disclosure systems, each 
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corresponding to a specific privacy-utility tradeoff. Also introduces privacy mechanisms 
designed to realize those tradeoff points. Chakraborty et al. [112] propose a framework 
for protecting data against unwanted inferences. This technique involves a white list of 
inferences that are desirable and provide utility, as well as a black list for unwanted 
inferences that should be kept private. From there, the authors attempt to define how 
much the recipient can infer from shared data based on utility-privacy parameters. They 
identify bounds on the parameters and provide mechanisms for achieving the bounds. 
2.4.2 Location Privacy Techniques 
Various techniques have been used in attempt to preserve the privacy of a user’s 
location. Different approaches could involve or not involve a trusted third party [113]. 
Some approaches include degrading the quality of location information (obfuscation) 
[114] [115], creating fake location points [116], uncertainty [117] [118], pseudonyms 
[119], encryption [120] [121], and k-anonymity [122]. Policy-based access control is 
another technique which is used to decide whether a requesting subject can perform a 
given action on a data object. Various approaches for context-aware access control have 
been explored, which can also be used to preserve location privacy [123].  
IETF RFC6280 by Barnes et al. [124] presents Geopriv, an architecture for location and 
location privacy in Internet applications. Geopriv is an Internet Best Current Practice, 
which enables users to express preferences for the disclosure of their location 
information. For example, the user can make a rule that their location is not to be 
disclosed beyond the intended recipient. This architecture binds the privacy rules to the 
data so that receiving entities are informed of when their data is shared to other parties. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we provided a background on the concept of toy computing, including 
the concepts of mobile services and physical computing. Next, we established a 
foundation on privacy in this context, including a description of XML-based privacy 
policy assertion languages including P3P and XACML. Finally, we provided an overview 
of some related works on mobile/web services privacy frameworks and location privacy.  
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  Privacy Requirements in Chapter 3
Toy Computing 
This chapter outlines the privacy requirements for a toy computing environment. The 
unique architecture of toy computing requires consideration of several different factors. 
In this chapter we investigate the privacy requirements through formal threat modeling 
techniques to help the reader to get more comfortable with the toy computing 
architecture and how it maps to privacy threats. Next, we identify privacy requirements 
at legislative level, identifying privacy laws and regulations which apply to this context. 
The toy industry has also issued regulations for toy safety; however these regulations 
have no mention of privacy. While parents aim to protect the privacy of their children, 
we investigate the unique requirements of end users.  
3.1 Privacy Issues in Toy Computing 
Table 3.1 outlines a comparison between a traditional toy, electronic toy, and toy 
computing. This illustrates how toy computing has evolved into a new paradigm, which 
inspires unique privacy concerns for children. Traditionally, toys have been entirely 
autonomous and do not have any processing capabilities or communicate with any 
other device. While a child user is engaged with a traditional toy, it will collect and store 
no personal data, and require no reason for concern for a child’s privacy.  
With the introduction of electronic toys with embedded systems, electronic toys can 
have sensory capabilities, and the ability to collect and store inputted data based on the 
user’s interactions. This data is limited and used only for the interaction, often discarded 
immediately. While an electronic toy has the potential to collect and store user data, it 
operates on an entirely autonomous platform as a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). An 
electronic toy has limited or no networking capability. Thus, privacy concerns are limited 
to nonexistent in this architecture.  
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As outlined in Chapter 2, toy computing inherits the privacy concerns associated with 
mobile devices and BYOD. While toy computing technology allocates computing power 
to a mobile device, this is outside of the TCB and the device is untrusted. A mobile 
device also has the capability to collect a wide range of context information on the user, 
including their location data. Toy computing architecture allows and often requires 
information to be shared to services and other users. One of the most prominent 
concerns to privacy for toy computing compared to traditional and electronic toys is the 
networking capability which allows for the possibility of sharing information over a 
network. A mobile service is able to connect through a network to many other entities, 
including other mobile and Web services, servers, devices, and other users. While the 
mobile service has this ability to connect to and communicate with an extensive and 
possibly unknown amount of external entities, the issue of data sharing becomes a 
concern.  
Table 3.1 Comparison of Traditional Toys, Electronic Toys, and Toy Computing 
 Traditional Toy Electronic Toy Toy Computing 
Interaction 
Medium 




 Sensors – e.g. 
light, motion  
 Physical – touch 
 Visual – camera 
 Auditory – 
microphone 
 Sensors – GPS, 
motion sensors, 
etc. 
 Wireless interface 
(network) 
Data Collection None Limited High - pervasive 




No Maybe Yes 
Processing 
Capabilities 
N/A Yes - limited Yes - advanced 
Networking N/A Limited or none  Communicates with 
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These threats can be summarized as the following three items that affect the privacy in 
toy computing.   
1. Child’s Identity 
2. Location Data 
3. Networking Capabilities  
When a child engages in toy computing activities, their identity is associated with the 
data collected from the device. The mobile service connects to other entities over a 
network and shares the data. This reveals the unique privacy issues of toy computing: 
when a child engages with a toy computing toy, the child’s identity is associated with 
their location data and can be shared over a network. This unique threat architecture is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
This sharing of sensitive location data opens up vulnerabilities such as customer 
profiling of minors, and child predators. Customer profiling of minors involves accessing 
collected data to create portfolios of users related to their location history (e.g. the 
ability to collect data on when and where a user was, including travel patterns). This is 
typically used for online marketing, however location data allows for tracking and 
inferences on user behavior that is not otherwise publically available. Further, when 
Capabilities other devices and  
services 
 Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
NFC, RFID, USB 
Data Storage N/A Limited to device  On Device (flash 
memory, SD card) 









BYOD – device is 
untrusted 
Platform Closed Closed Open 
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physical location data is being shared with other users, it is important to consider a 
child’s physical safety in regards to child predators who could potentially locate them 
based on learning their GPS location, possibly paired with other sensitive data. 
 
Figure 3.1 Child Identity and External Parties 
While these privacy issues are common in the domains of mobile and online privacy, 
they are relatively new to the domain of toys. Due to the mainly child user base, and the 
physical toy component, toy computing separates itself from the other categories and 
identifies as a unique area for privacy concerns. Table 3.2 provides a comparison 
between the three categories of toys, as well as online/mobile services, illustrating the 
unique privacy concerns of toy computing. 









Physical Toy X X X  
Child’s Identity X X X X 
Collects Data  X X X 
Networking 
Capability 
 Maybe X X 
BYOD model   X X 
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Toy computing technology which embraces sensory and networking capabilities opens 
up new threats to privacy, stimulates new user requirements, and establishes a unique 
case for existing laws and regulations. Toy computing inherits laws and regulations from 
the components that make it up (services, mobile, toys), however, there are no laws 
that explicitly regulate the unique environment of toy computing. There is also no 
widely adopted framework to allow parents to manage the privacy of their children 
using toy computing technology. For this reason it is necessary to outline the privacy 
requirements to present a solution to managing location privacy for a toy computing 
environment. 
3.2 Privacy Threat Model 
In this section, we investigate the privacy of toy computing from a threat modeling 
perspective. Threat modeling is a useful tool to assess risk associated with a system and 
provides a structured approach to security and privacy. Threat modeling can be included 
as part of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDL). In this section, we aim to identify 
location privacy threats in a toy computing environment. We present a privacy threat 
model for toy computing with a focus on location privacy. 
3.2.1 Threat Modeling Techniques 
Several approaches have been developed for threat modeling, one of the most widely 
adapted being Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Process [125] (illustrated in Figure 3.2) and 
STRIDE Model [126] for identifying six categories of security threats: Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of 
Privilege. This model presents an excellent approach to understanding and decomposing 
an application to identify security threats, however there is little focus on privacy. In 
order to preserve privacy, there must be a foundation of security. To achieve this, it 
must be ensured that the system has a reasonable level of security mechanisms in place, 
and that personal information is protected from a security perspective. While the focus 
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of this thesis is on privacy, we will assume that the system has a reasonable level of 
security. 
 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) has developed their own 
Application Threat Model [127] which has some similarities to Microsoft’s model. Based 
on this model, OWASP has also developed a Mobile Threat Model [128] to identify 
security threats specifically for mobile applications. OWASP also recommends 
Microsoft’s STRIDE model for identifying threats. We found this useful to consider in a 
threat model for toy computing, which occurs in a mobile environment. However, this 
model once again has little focus on privacy.  
 
Figure 3.2 Microsoft's Threat Modeling Process. Adapted from [94] 
Figure 3.3 LINDDUN Threat Modeling Process, adapted from [99] 
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While both of the above models are primarily concerned with security, there is no 
widely adopted framework for modeling privacy threats, especially in mobile 
environments [129]. Deng et al. [130] [131] have developed a methodology called 
LINDDUN which provides a comprehensive privacy threat modeling framework. Figure 
3.3 illustrates the threat modeling steps in the LINDDUN methodology.  
Like the STRIDE and OWASP models, LINDDUN identifies privacy threats by data flow 
elements and maps them to privacy threats. Misuse case scenarios and privacy threat 
tree patterns illustrate privacy attack scenarios, which are then prioritized through risk 
assessment techniques. In the final two steps of this method, mapping the privacy 
threats to privacy requirements allows for the identification of privacy enhancing 
solutions. The LINDDUN methodology provides an excellent framework for modeling 
privacy, although it was not designed for mobile applications in particular. LINDDUN was 
adapted from the STRIDE model [125], using similar threat modeling principles (data 
flow diagrams, threat trees and trust boundaries) and mapping them to privacy 
properties based on the terminology defined by Pfitzmann et al. [132]. These privacy 
threats described below are the basis of the LINDDUN methodology and widely 
recognized in the privacy research community: 
1. Linkability – An attacker is able to distinguish whether two or more items of interest 
(e.g. subjects, messages, actions, etc.) are related or not within the system. 
2. Identifiability – An attacker can sufficiently identify a subject associated to an item 
of interest, for example, the sender of a message. Usually, identifiability refers to a 
set of potential subjects. This is a special case of linkability between a subject and its 
attributes. Identifiability is a threat to anonymity and pseudonimity. 
3. Non-repudiation – This allows an attacker to gather evidence to counter the claims 
of the repudiating party and to prove that a user knows, has done or has said 
something. 
4. Detectability – An attacker can sufficiently distinguish whether an item exists or not 
(e.g. messages are sufficiently discernible from random noise). 
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5. Information Disclosure – Personal information is exposed to individuals who are not 
supposed to have access to it. 
6. Content unawareness- A user is unaware of the information disclosed to the system. 
The user either provides too much information which allows an attacker to easily 
retrieve the user’s identity or inaccurate information which can cause wrong 
decisions or actions. 
7. Policy and Consent Noncompliance – This means that even though the system 
shows its privacy policies to its users, there is no guarantee that the system actually 
complies to the advertised policies. Therefore, the user’s personal data might still be 
revealed. 
The above threats can be categorized into hard or soft privacy threats [131]. Our focus 
for this thesis is on soft privacy: information disclosure and content awareness. Soft 
privacy is based on the assumption that the data subject is not in control of personal 
data, and must trust the data controllers (service providers). This is the domain of 
policies, access control and audit. In this model, the data subject provides personal data 
and the data controller is responsible for it. Policy consent and noncompliance is beyond 
the scope of this work, which assumes that the system complies with its privacy policies.   
3.2.1.1 Our Approach 
Based on the above threat modeling techniques, we have adapted our own technique 
appropriate for modeling privacy threats in a mobile toy computing environment. Below 
is the threat modeling process we will be covering in the following sections, adapted 
from Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Principles [125] and STRIDE Model [126], OWASP’s 
Mobile Threat Model [128], and the LINDDUN methodology for privacy threat analysis 
by Deng et al. [131]. We believe that this will provide an effective analysis of privacy 
threats in a mobile toy computing environment. 
Our approach, illustrated in Figure 3.4, uses a similar process as the three models 
discussed, with greatest motivation from LINDDUN. Starting with an overview of the 
technical architecture, we will identify location data assets and data flow. Next we will 
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use the LINDDUN methodology to identify privacy threats and threat agents, and 
illustrate methods of attack through threat trees. Lastly we will use this analysis to 
identify privacy requirements and controls to mitigate threats to location privacy.  
 
Figure 3.4 Threat Modeling Process 
3.2.2 Architecture Overview 
A toy computing application allows the user to interact with a physical toy device along 
with a mobile device to play a game. From an architectural perspective, we will consider 
the end user components (the user, physical toy component, and mobile device) as one 
entity, which in our diagram will be referred to simply as the mobile device. The user is 
the individual who is playing with the toy, which is connected to a mobile device also 
operated by the user. The user interacts with the physical toy and/or mobile device 
through touch screen, microphone, camera, and/or other sensors such as the 
accelerometer. The physical toy component may or may not have embedded systems, 
but must be able to interact in some way with the mobile device (ex. physically, visually, 
audibly, or through a wireless interface). The toy computing environment follows the 
BYOD model, where the mobile device is provided by the user and may take the form of 
a smartphone or tablet. GPS location data is also collected and stored on the mobile 
device. Data is stored on the device in flash memory and/or removable storage (i.e. SD 
card), and communicated over wireless interfaces such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, or 
RFID.  
3.2.3 Assets and Data Flow 
3.2.3.1 Identify Assets 
With a focus on location privacy, potential sensitive data that could be collected on the 
user is as follows. Location data is collected through the GPS on the mobile device. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, location can be expressed as absolute, relative, or type of 
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location. For the purpose of this scenario, we are concerned with absolute location, 
which is the location expressed in a range or exact GPS coordinates, latitude and 
longitude. The absolute location can be expressed as coarse or fine [61]. The location 
can be collected as a single GPS location event (the location of the user at one point in 
time), or a GPS trace (a series of location events recorded over a period of time, showing 
location history). A GPS location includes a timestamp for the time it was detected. The 
location of the user may be directly or indirectly associated with their real identity and 
other profile data. In the case of toy computing, the user is a child under the age of 13, 
their personal information is particularly sensitive, especially when associated with their 
real identity. Alternatively, location data may be anonymous or associated with a 
pseudonym. This depends on the architecture and privacy practices of the specific 
application and service provider, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Our focus is on 
enabling the user to be in control of their privacy by specifying their privacy preferences, 
under the assumption that the service has published an accurate privacy policy and also 
complies with it. Inferences can be made based on GPS location combined with other 
data such as: 
 Type of motion (walking, standing, running, driving, etc.). 
 Interactions with other users, friends in same location (e.g. who they are with at a 
certain time/day). 
 User’s real identity associated with their location (name, age, profile data). 
 Behavior (e.g. religious beliefs based on going to church, or health based on 
frequent doctor’s appointments). 
 Location of home, school or daycare. 
 Travel patterns (e.g. where they are likely to be at a given time or day). 
 If a child is home and parents may not be (e.g. during work hours), or alternatively if 
a child is in a public place while a parent may not be. 
From the service provider’s perspective, it is necessary to collect this data for the 
purpose of running the game. Parents who wish to be in control of their child’s private 
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location data may limit the collection of this data under certain contexts depending on a 
company’s privacy policies.  
3.2.3.2 Data Flow 
Use Case Application - Blaster Toy First-Person-Shooter (FPS) Game 
When a game starts, the mobile device connects to mobile service(s) which support 
gameplay. For the case of this study with a focus on location privacy, the mobile service 
receives GPS location data on the user and responds with location-based services such 
as the location of other players. Also connected to the service are other players, and 
other potential third parties. A blaster toy first-person-shooter (FPS) game, such as Tek 
Recon (discussed in Chapter 2), will be used as a use case application throughout this 
section. Tek Recon a multiplayer mobile toy computing environment, where users 
participate in a game with their friends through a mobile application over a network. 
With our focus on location privacy, the game uses GPS location data from all of the 
users’ mobile devices so they can locate each other on the map.  
In the DFD illustrated in Figure 3.5, the user is represented as a 3-tuple entity (user, toy, 
mobile device) which interacts with the system. The toy computing environment 
contains two processes: the mobile service and the walled garden module. While a user 
is engaged in the game, they interact with the physical toy and the mobile device, and 
the mobile device is connected to a mobile service, which may be connected to other 
entities over a network. GPS location data is collected from the user from the GPS on 
the device. When the mobile service sends a request for the location data, the mobile 
device forwards the request to the walled garden module, which checks the policies and 
makes an access control decision for the request. If the request is permitted, the mobile 
device then responds to the mobile service with the requested location data.  
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Figure 3.5 Tek Recon Game Data Flow Diagram 
3.2.4 Privacy Threats 
3.2.4.1 Identify Privacy Threats 
From a policy perspective, any data sharing practices that may result in any of the above 
LINDDUN threats should be identified in the system’s privacy policy. This work depends 
heavily on the assumption that the service has published an accurate privacy policy and 
also complies with it. For the purpose of this thesis, we aim to address the threats of 
information disclosure and content unawareness. Information disclosure occurs when a 
user’s personal information is exposed to individuals who are not supposed to have 
access to it. For the purpose of this work we will assume that although the information 
disclosure practices are outlined in the privacy policy, and the user has provided their 
consent, the user is not actually aware due to the face that they did not read or 
understand the policy. Content Unawareness occurs when the user is unaware of the 
information that is collected on them, for example their location information. Looking at 
these threats in more detail, the IETF’s RFC6973 on Privacy Considerations [133] 
provides more specific secondary threats which fall under the categories of Information 
Disclosure and Content Unawareness. In the model, we attempt to prevent all four of 
these categories of threats to children: 
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 Surveillance: “the observation or monitoring of an individual’s communications or 
activities. The effects of surveillance on the individual can range from anxiety and 
discomfort to behavioral changes such as inhibition and self-censorship, and even to 
the perpetration of violence against the individual. The individual need not be aware 
of the surveillance for it to impact his or her privacy – the possibility of surveillance 
may be enough to harm individual autonomy.” 
 Secondary Use: the use of collected information about an individual without the 
individual's consent for a purpose different from that for which the information was 
collected.  Secondary use may violate people's expectations or desires. The potential 
for secondary use can generate uncertainty as to how one's information will be used 
in the future, potentially discouraging information exchange in the first place.   
 Disclosure: Disclosure is the revelation of information about an individual that 
affects the way others judge the individual. Disclosure can violate individuals' 
expectations of the confidentiality of the data they share. The threat of disclosure 
may deter people from engaging in certain activities for fear of reputational harm, or 
simply because they do not wish to be observed. 
 Exclusion: Exclusion is the failure to allow individuals to know about the data that 
others have about them and to participate in its handling and use.  Exclusion reduces 
accountability on the part of entities that maintain information about people and 
creates a sense of vulnerability in relation to individuals' ability to control how 
information about them is collected and used. 
3.2.4.2 Mapping Privacy Threats to DFD 
Referencing the DFD from Figure 3.5, we will now outline the DFD elements and then 
map the privacy threats to the DFD. Table 3.3 shows the DFD elements in the Blaster FPS 
Game mentioned in the previous section. 
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Service 
Data Store User’s Location Resources on Mobile Device 
Service Database (DB) 
Data Flow User data stream (user to game) 
Service data stream (game to service) 
DB data stream (service to DB) 
 
Now based on the above DFD elements, in Table 3.4 we map the LINDDUN privacy 
threats to DFD element types (E: Entity, DF: data flow, DS: data store, P: process) in a 
toy computing scenario with the Tek Recon example: 
Table 3.4 Mapping Privacy Threats to DFD Elements 




Linkability x x x x 
Identifiability x x x x 
Non-repudiation  x x x 
Detectability  x x x 
Information Disclosure T A A A 
Content Unawareness T    
Policy/Consent 
Noncompliance 
 A A A 
Legend: [x = Out of Scope, T = Threats addressed, A = Assumed to Comply] 
The threat of information disclosure occurs at the process, data store, and data flow 
levels. This falls into the control of the service provider, who outlines information 
disclosure practices in their privacy policy. While we assume that the service has 
accurate policies and also complies with them, the threat we are concerned with is then 
with the entity who agrees to disclose the information. Content unawareness is a threat 
to the entity (user). The user is required to provide the necessary consent to process 
personal data. The goal of our model is to address the threats of Content Unawareness 
from the perspective of the user, putting them in control of information disclosure. This 
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model will address information disclosure from the entity (user)’s perspective who 
complies with information disclosure practices. This model is acting under the 
assumption that the process, data store, and data flow elements all act in compliance 
with their policies and the consent of the user.  
3.2.5 Methods of Attack 
In this section we will observe different methods an attacker can use to reach the data. 
First we will examine privacy threats based on Table 3.3 in the previous section to 
determine privacy threat trees. Next, we will create misuse case scenarios based on the 
threat tree patterns. 
3.2.5.1 Privacy Threat Trees 
Information Disclosure 
Figure 3.6 refers to the privacy threat tree for information disclosure. For the purpose of 
this work, we are referring to intentional information disclosure, which is predefined by 
the service and outlined in the privacy policy, rather than information disclosure as a 
result of security exploits. Information disclosure can occur at process, data store, or 
data flow level. Location information may be disclosed to other users or with a third 
party. The threats related to sharing an entity’s location data can lead to undesirable 
inferences of the user’s behavior and personal life (see list of inferences in Section 
3.2.3). A child’s location data sent to a third party can be used for customer profiling of 
the child. Sharing location data with other users puts the physical safety of the child user 
at risk if it is shared with an untrusted entity. For these reasons, a user may choose not 
to consent to sharing their location data depending on privacy policy practices.  
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Figure 3.6 Information Disclosure Privacy Threat Tree 
Content Unawareness of Entity 
Content unawareness occurs at the user level when the user provides more personal 
data than is required, or does not read the privacy policies. Providing too much personal 
data is unnecessary and opens up opportunity for further undesirable inferences. It is 
also possible that a user does not read the privacy policies and therefore is unaware 
that certain aspects of their personal data is being collected and shared. The user may 
be unaware of the purpose their location data is collected, or how it is used. The user 
may not even be aware that their location information is being collected at all. 
Additionally, the user may not be aware that their location data is being shared with 
third parties. All of these situations can result in information disclosure (see previous 
section) to which the user has unknowingly provided their consent. 
 
Figure 3.7 Content Unawareness Privacy Threat Tree 
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3.2.5.2 Misuse Case Scenarios 
In this section we provide a misuse case scenario of Tek Recon based on the threat tree 
patterns in the previous section. The misuse case model is based on the LINDDUN 
model.  
Content Unawareness and Information Disclosure 
The threat trees in the previous section indicates that in order to be susceptible to the 
threat of content awareness, the user either unknowingly provides too much personal 
data, or does not read privacy policies. For information disclosure, the mobile service 
forwards the data to a third party or another user. These are the preconditions of the 
misuse case. To create the attack scenarios, the attacker first needs to have access to 
the data store, and either the user (data subject) can be re-identified or the 
pseudonyms can be linkable. In this scenario, the actions of the misactor are actually 
completely legitimate as outlined in their privacy policy, however the data use/sharing 
practices do not comply with the user’s expectations or legislation. 
 Title: Misuse Case 1: Content Unawareness and Information Disclosure 
 Summary: User unknowingly provides location data to the service 
 Assets, stakeholders and threats: location information of the user. The 
parent/guardian and user are unaware the information is collected and sent. 
Potential threats: surveillance, secondary use, disclosure, exclusion 
 Primary Misactor: Parent/guardian for not reading privacy policy. 
 Basic Flow:  
1. Parent/guardian consents to privacy policy without reading it. 
2. User unknowingly sends location information to the mobile service. 
 Alternative Flow:  
3. Same as the above, and the mobile service sends user’s location information 
to a third party for marketing purposes. 
 Trigger: Parent/guardian does not read the privacy policy which outlines the mobile 
service’s privacy practices. 
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 Preconditions:  
1. Parent/guardian provides consent but has not read or understood the 
privacy policies. 
2. Parent/guardian and user have some sort of expectation for privacy which is 
does not actually correlate with the privacy policy or the data use/sharing 
practices of the service. 
3.2.6 Privacy Requirements/Controls  
Based on the above analysis of threats and attack scenarios, we now propose some 
privacy requirements and controls needed to mitigate these threats. The IETF outlines in 
their privacy considerations [133], two major mitigation techniques to deter threats of 
surveillance, disclosure, secondary use and exclusion. Techniques are data minimization 
and user participation: 
 Data Minimization: limiting collection, use, disclosure, retention, identifiability, 
sensitivity, and access to personal data to the minimal amount necessary to perform 
a task. Reducing the amount of data exchanged reduces the amount of data that can 
be misused or leaked. Data Minimization mitigates the threats of: surveillance, 
secondary use, and disclosure. 
 User Participation: data collection and use that happens “in secret,” without the 
individual’s knowledge, is apt to violate the individual’s expectation of privacy and 
may create incentives for misuse of data. As a result, privacy regimes tend to include 
provisions to support informing individuals about data collection and use and 
involving them in decisions about the treatment of their data.  In an engineering 
context, supporting the goal of user participation usually means providing ways for 
users to control the data that is shared about them.  It may also mean providing 
ways for users to signal how they expect their data to be used and shared. User 
participation mitigates the threats of: surveillance, secondary use, disclosure, and 
exclusion. 
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Our threat model illustrates that the privacy requirements for toy computing are data 
minimization and user participation, in order to mitigate the threats of information 
disclosure and content unawareness, which can lead to surveillance, disclosure, 
secondary use and exclusion. Privacy controls which achieve the goals of data 
minimization and user participation include implementing a privacy access control 
model.  
3.3 Privacy Considerations 
3.3.1 End User Requirements for Children 
Children provide a unique user base which requires special attention in several key 
areas related to their privacy. Firstly, it is widely accepted internationally that that a 
child’s data is considered particularly sensitive and should be treated with extreme care 
[12] [13]. Online privacy for children has been a great concern, and this concern is 
inherited into the toy computing environment, particularly when the child’s location is 
involved and can be potentially shared with other parties. Children must be protected 
from violence, sexual abuse and exploitation which they can be vulnerable to online 
including harassment, stalking, grooming, sexual abuse or exploitation, or personal data 
misuse [14]. Sexual solicitation and internet-initiated offline encounters are a major 
issue for the online safety of children [15]. The U.S. Department of Justice [16] indicates 
that “1 in 25 youths received an online sexual solicitation in which the solicitor tried to 
make offline contact.” All of these risks are increased with the possibility of a potential 
solicitor becoming aware of the child’s location or historical location patterns. On the 
other hand, children also take up a large segment of the consumer population and are 
of particular interest to market researchers who may attempt to collect their personal 
data and usage patterns for targeted advertising [17]. Third party advertisers can infer a 
great amount of information about a child based on their location and other context 
information, collecting detailed behavioral profiles that may be used for unknown or 
unwanted purposes. 
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Another concern with child users is that the usage patterns of children differ from that 
of an adult. Children often have little understanding or regard for the privacy of their 
information, and are more likely to act in spontaneous ways. The usage behavior of 
children indicates that they are more open to giving out personal information, which 
makes issues of sensitive data sharing of great concern. Child users exhibit a varying 
level of awareness when it comes to their online activities and understanding of privacy 
risks. There is a fluctuating level of comfort and knowledge with technology and online 
activities among children, where usage and online behavior differ according to their age, 
development level, and frequency of use. Children may lack the maturity to appreciate 
the wider social and personal consequences of revealing or agreeing to share their 
personal information online, or the use of their personal information for commercial 
purposes [13]. Younger children in particular generally lack the skills and confidence in 
areas of internet use that are especially important for safety [14]. In order to be 
effective, privacy protection strategies are required which incorporate measures and 
messages appropriate to different ages and levels of understanding [134].  
The online mobile environment and associated toy computing technology provides 
many opportunities for children, but is also accompanied by several risks. Many 
initiatives have been undertaken in attempt to provide an online environment which is 
safe and age-appropriate, and to help children to be empowered and engaged in the 
online environment [135]. Organizations such as UNICEF have been working to promote 
digital citizenship among children and develop products and platforms that facilitate 
children’s positive use of technology [13]. Noted by Westin [136], “each individual is 
continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire 
for privacy with the desire of disclosure and communication of himself to others.” 
Several works such as [137] iterate the competing goals of utility vs. privacy. A popular 
theme in industry guidelines indicates a need for balance between children’s right to 
protection from violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, and the right to information 
access, freedom of expression, privacy and non-discrimination [134]. Measures for 
protection must also not be overly restrictive for the child or other users [13]. It is 
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possible for some measures to challenge current business models, reduce the 
competitiveness of a company, or threaten other freedoms currently observed online 
[134]. The Toy Industry Association (TIA) has raised concerns that restrictions could limit 
the ability for toy companies to obtain necessary data to analyze and improve content, 
allow children to enjoy personalized but anonymous online experiences, and benefit 
from the ability to offer targeted advertising on their e-commerce and adult sites [138]. 
Thus it is necessary to find the appropriate balance between privacy and freedoms to 
users.  
3.3.2 Parental Control 
A report from Pew Research Center and Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University [139] indicates that the majority of parents in the United States are 
concerned about their children’s online privacy, some of the main concerns being 
related to strangers online, and the data advertisers are collecting about their children’s 
online behavior. While parents strive to ensure their child’s physical and online safety 
and privacy, they may wish to be in control of how their personal data is shared through 
the devices they are using. The main protection children have on the Internet is parental 
guidance and supervision [17]. Privacy controls can allow parents to create policies to 
prevent their children from allowing their data to be collected from services according 
to their preferences. The ITU and UNICEF recommend parental controls “not to transfer 
responsibility for children’s ICT use to parents alone, but to recognize that parents are in 
a better position to decide what is appropriate for their children and should be aware of 
all risks in order to better protect their children and empower them to take action” [13]. 
Parental controls can be rated by their functionality, effectiveness, usability, and 
security [140]: 
 Functionality: Does the tool have the required functions for the parent’s needs? 
 Effectiveness: Does the tool successfully block the intended content or action? 
 Usability: Is the tool easy to install, configure and use? 
 Security: Does the tool prevent the child from bypassing or disabling the controls? 
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In regards to usability, parents sometimes have less understanding and knowledge of 
the internet and mobile devices than their children. Further, convergence of mobile 
devices and internet services makes parental oversight more difficult [13]. This 
introduces difficulties with a parent’s ability to effectively implement privacy controls 
for their child. In a mobile toy computing environment, the child will likely be using 
either a mobile device belonging to his/her parent or using his/her own mobile device. 
Parents may face privacy challenges related to reviewing privacy policies of applications 
that they or their children may be using. A study by Chin et al. [141] of 60 participants 
found that users are highly likely to install free applications, and place a higher value on 
other user reviews than of privacy policies and EULAs.  
Also, users often have more dangerous tendencies on their mobile behavior than they 
do on a computer or laptop. When reviewing privacy policies, parents are likely to face 
difficulty in reading and understanding the policies. A further study by Felt et al. [142] 
found that only 17% of participants paid attention to permissions during installation, 
and only 3% could correctly answer permission comprehension questions. It can be 
inferred from this research that the majority of users do not understand or care about 
the permission warnings that they receive on their mobile devices. This is a huge 
disadvantage to the current permissions system, illustrates the need to improve the 
usability of privacy protecting systems.  
Peng et al. [143] discuss the importance of communicating the privacy risks of an 
application to users, while also proposing a method for ranking risks based on 
probabilistic generative models. It is understandable that parents will run into similar 
issues with understanding privacy practices in regards to their children. While they will 
also likely be even more concerned with their child’s privacy, it is important to 
parents/guardians that they are able to understand and correctly control their child’s 
private data. A privacy preserving framework is required to allow parents to easily and 
effectively set preferences to control and restrict the personal data that can be collected 
on their child. 
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3.3.3 Privacy Laws and Regulations 
Privacy protection laws define the rights of data subjects (users), the responsibilities of 
data collectors (service providers), and methods for dispute resolution. These laws are 
generally enforced through ombudsmen (e.g. Privacy Commissioner of Canada), or 
licensing bureaus (e.g. CNIL in France) [21]. Different countries and legislations have 
different laws for privacy protection, and there are also many international guidelines 
and industry regulations which outline privacy best practices. These laws and 
regulations can also differ depending on what type of information is being collected (e.g. 
health information), or who the users are (e.g. children under the age of 13). In this 
thesis, we aim to investigate the privacy aspects relevant to the child users, toys and 
safety, and location data.  
Toy computing encompasses a range of technologies, including traditional and 
electronic toys, internet, mobile devices, and inherits the privacy requirements and 
governing laws and regulations of each, with particular attention to children. Traditional 
distinctions between different parts of the telecommunications and mobile phone 
industries, and between internet companies and broadcasters, are fast breaking down 
or becoming irrelevant [13]. With the change in technology, regulating bodies have 
recently been striving to update laws, regulations and industry guidelines. Table 3.5 
shows the privacy concerns associated with each technology and the corresponding 
laws and regulating organizations to address them.  
Table 3.5 Privacy Concerns and Regulation Across Toy Computing Components 
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3.3.3.1 Privacy Principles 
Canada’s privacy laws are outlined in The Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documentation Act (PIPEDA) [19], which governs how personal information 
can be collected, used, and disclosed in commercial business. PIPEDA is based on the 10 
principles of privacy outlined in the Canadian Standards Association’s (CSA) Model Code 
for the Protection of Personal Information [144], which has been recognized as a 
national standard as of 1996 [22]. This model code is representative of principles behind 
privacy legislation in many countries, including the United States and the European 
Union. It also bears similarities to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data [145] which have been adopted by member countries of the European 
Union [146]. The CSA’s 10 Principles of Privacy are summarized as follows [22]: 
1. Accountability – an organization is responsible for personal information under its 
control and shall designate an individual or individuals who are accountable for the 
organization’s compliance with the following principles. 
2. Identifying Purposes – the purpose for which personal information is collected shall 
be identified by the organization at or before the time the information is collected. 
3. Consent – The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except when appropriate. 
4. Limiting Collection – the collection of personal information shall be limited to that 
which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall 
be collected by fair and lawful means. 
5. Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention – personal information shall not be used or 
disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected, except with the 
consent of the individual or as required by the law. Personal information shall be 
retained only as long as necessary for fulfillment of those purposes. 
6. Accuracy – personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is 
necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used. 
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7. Safeguards – personal information shall be protected by security safeguards 
appropriate to the sensitivity of the information. 
8. Openness – an organization shall make readily available to individuals specific 
information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal 
information. 
9. Individual Access – upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, 
use and disclosure of his/her personal information and shall be given access to that 
information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness 
of the information and have it amended as appropriate. 
10. Challenging Compliance – an individual shall be able to address a challenge 
concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated individual or 
individuals for the organization’s compliance. 
Children’s Privacy Laws 
PIPEDA does not mention any special regulations for children. While PIPEDA requires 
meaningful consent for the collection of personal data collection, it does not refer to a 
particular age threshold for this. There is a difficulty in determining if a child is able to 
provide meaningful consent, as this greatly depends on their cognitive and emotional 
development and their understanding of privacy and online practices [12]. The Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has indicated in the Online Behavioural 
Advertising Guidelines [24], a focus towards protecting children’s online privacy 
particularly in the region of online behavioural targeted advertisements. The OPC 
recommends for organizations to avoid knowingly tracking children and websites aimed 
at children. The OPC has also made the following recommendations regarding the 
management of the personal information of children and youth [12], however these 
recommendations are not legally binding: 
 Children’s information is considered sensitive and merits special consideration under 
privacy laws. 
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 Organizations should implement innovative ways of presenting privacy information 
to children and youth that take into account their cognitive and emotional 
development and life experience. 
The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (COPPA) [23] protects the online privacy of children under the age of 13, and 
indicates that a child’s personal information cannot be collected without parental 
consent. In 2010, an amendment to COPPA further elaborated that personal 
information includes geolocation information, photographs, and videos.  
In the European Union, privacy laws are governed by the European Union Data 
Protection Directive (EUDPD) 95/46/EC [146], which also has special considerations for 
children under the age of 13. The Directive states that consent must be given by the 
child’s parent or custodian, and must also be verifiable (Article 8). Further, the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) [18] is the most widely endorsed 
international human rights treaty. This treaty protects children from all forms of 
violence, exploitation and abuse and discrimination, and ensures that the child’s best 
interest should be the primary consideration in any matters affecting them. UNICEF 
defines children as individuals under the age of 18, according to Article 1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of a Child [13].  
Canada does not have an equivalent to COPPA, or any specific mention of children 
within PIPEDA. For the purpose of this work we will consider the recommendations by 
the OPC to preserve children’s privacy. We will follow the direction of COPPA and the 
EUDPD in the definition of a child as an individual under the age of 13 years old. With 
this in mind, we aim to assist the parent/guardian in protecting the privacy of their child 
by putting them in control of the information of their child that is shared.  
Location Privacy Laws 
There do not appear to be special laws in place for regulating the privacy aspects of 
location data, however it is categorized as personal information is therefore covered by 
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PIPEDA. PIPEDA recognizes personal information in Section 2(1) as “information about 
an identifiable individual, but does not include the name, title or business address or 
telephone number of an employee of an organization.” PIPEDA defines a “record” as 
including “any correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing, diagram, 
pictorial or graphic work, photograph, film, microform, sound recording, videotape, 
machine-readable record and any other documentary material, regardless of physical 
form or characteristics, and any copy of any of those things.” An “electronic document” 
is defined by PIPEDA is “data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a 
computer system or other similar device and that can be read or perceived by a person 
or a computer system or other similar device. It includes a display, printout or other 
output of that data.” GPS data is not explicitly mentioned in either of these definitions, 
however it is possible that it could be considered included. In a 2006 PIPEDA case 
summary, tracking information collected from a GPS placed in company vehicles was 
acknowledged as personal information, “since the information can be linked to specific 
employees driving the vehicles. The employees are identifiable even if they are not 
identified at all times to all users of the system” (PIPEDA Case Summary #2006-351). In 
2010, an amendment to COPPA further elaborated that personal information includes 
geolocation information, photographs, and videos. For the purpose of this work, we will 
consider COPPA’s reference to geolocation information as a type of personal 
information to be protected.  
Health Canada’s Safety Requirements for Children’s Toys and Related 
Products 
In Canada, the Canada Consumer Product Safety Act (CCPSA) applies to all 
manufactures, importers, advertisers, sellers, or testers of a consumer product. A toy is 
defined by the Government of Canada’s Toy Regulations [147] as “a product that is 
intended for use by a child in learning or play.” Health Canada identifies a toy as 
intended for use by children less than 14 years of age, unless a younger age is 
prescribed within a requirement. This is consistent with several international toy safety 
standards [20]:  
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 ISO 8124-1 Safety of toys - Part 1: Safety aspects related to mechanical and physical 
properties 
 EN71-1 Safety of toys - Part 1: Mechanical and physical properties 
 ASTM F963 Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Toy Safety 
These safety requirements were designed for traditional toys and outline primarily 
physical safety hazards (e.g. mechanical hazards, electrical hazards, etc.). Electric toys 
have specific safety standards as well, and must meet the requirements as set out in 
Canadian Standards Association Standard C22.2 No. 149-1972, Electrically Operated 
Toys, (Section 5 of the Toys Regulations). While safety concerns concentrate primarily 
on physical safety limited to the physical design of the toy, privacy is not a topic widely 
addressed in the toy industry. Safety is a concern related to privacy when a breach of 
privacy can result in physical harm to the child. Physical threats to safety as a result of 
privacy breach can include exploitation, stalking, physical harm that can happen as a 
result of the knowledge of a child’s location. Current toy safety regulations are not up to 
date and do not acknowledge the possibility of this type of safety threat.  
3.3.3.2 Industry Guidelines and Best Practices 
While technology continues to change, there are limitations on privacy laws and many 
countries and states struggle to keep up with the changing environment. Privacy related 
to location information, child users, and responsible marketing to children have been 
emerging topics in recent years. In order to help regulate this, several regulating 
organizations have provided guidelines and recommendations for industry self-
regulation of the management of children’s data online and mobile environments. The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) have released guidelines for child online protection, stressing that companies 
in states which lack adequate legal frameworks for the protection of children’s rights to 
privacy and freedom of expression should follow enhanced due diligence to ensure 
policies and practices are in line with international law [13]. The guidelines encourage 
companies to adopt the highest privacy standards when it comes to collecting, 
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processing and storing data from or about children [13]. Further, services directed at or 
likely to attract a main audience of children must consider the risks posed to them by 
access to, or collection and use of, personal information (including location 
information), and ensure those risks are properly addressed [13].  
The Mobile Marketing Association (MMA) has issued a Mobile Application Privacy Policy 
Framework [148] to help mobile application providers to create privacy policies. This 
document has special considerations for location information and children. If a child has 
provided information without their parent’s consent, the parent can contact the 
provider to delete the information. The CTIA recommends Best practices and Guidelines 
for location based services [149] which follow closely with the privacy principles. This 
document does not appear to have much entirely unique for location information, but 
there are a couple notable items. The CTIA outlines that user’s location information 
should be retained by LBS providers only as long as required by business needs, after 
which time it must be destroyed. If location must be retained for long-term use it should 
be converted to aggregate or anonymized data. The importance of the protection of 
minors is also elaborated by the CTIA regarding the use and disclosure of location 
information. The Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) has also issued a report on the 
Application of Self-Regulatory Principles to the Mobile Environment [150]. The focus of 
this report is on transparency and control, and includes special considerations for 
“Precise Location Data.” 
The North American Toy Industry Association (TIA) released a whitepaper [138] 
regarding the changing privacy and data security landscape the toy industry is facing 
with the emerging popularity of child-directed mobile apps. The TIA iterates the issues 
of children’s marketing and privacy in this context, indicating that privacy and data 
security issues affect day to day operations of toy companies. The TIA offers the 
following concerns:  
 The FTC’s restrictions on third party sharing, except where information is used to 
support the internal functions of the website, could restrict routine use of web 
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analytics and other activities currently permitted under the existing rule. The 
proposed rule affirms that COPPA applies to all online services directed to children, 
including mobile apps. 
 Toy companies support parental authority and strive to offer children interactive, 
anonymous experiences under the current COPPA framework.  
 Self-regulation provides an effective means of protecting children’s privacy; intrusive 
oversight will undercut the effectiveness. 
3.4 Privacy Requirements for Toy Computing 
In this analysis for privacy in a toy computing environment, there were several factors to 
take into consideration regarding the privacy goals based on our threat model, end user 
requirements, laws and regulations. In this section we present the requirements for a 
privacy framework based on these factors. Data minimization and user participation are 
privacy goals based on our threat model. A framework is required which can achieve 
these privacy goals by minimizing the collection and retention of potentially sensitive 
user data, as well as involving the user (or parent) in the control of their child’s data. 
End user requirements need to consider that the main user base is children, who have 
unique requirements as they are especially vulnerable and in order to protect their 
sensitive location data, parents/guardians require a method to implement privacy 
controls on their child’s data. Next, the framework must help to achieve the 10 
principles of privacy and comply with PIPEDA. 
3.4.1 Six Privacy Constraints for Toy Computing 
Based on the above, we have compiled 6 privacy rights for parents/guardians to have 
control over their child’s location data in toy computing. These privacy requirements 
enforce the goals of data minimization and user participation, by allowing 
parents/guardians to be in control of how their child’s privacy is managed, and restrict 
the data that is collected. These requirements comply with the 10 principles of privacy 
of which PIPEDA is based.  
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1. The right for a parent/guardian to request restrictions on the use or disclosure of 
private information of their child. This allows parents/guardians to provide 
restrictions to purpose, recipients, obligations, and retention regarding their child’s 
location information. This protects children from having their location information 
being used or shared for any purpose considered illegitimate or unacceptable to the 
parent/guardian.  
 Goals: user participation, data minimization 
 Privacy Principles: consent, limiting collection, limiting use disclosure and 
retention 
2. The right for a parent/guardian to access, copy, and inspect collected records on 
their child. This allows a parent/guardian to access their child’s location records to 
see that data that is collected on them. 
 Goals: user participation 
 Privacy Principles: access 
3. The right for a parent/guardian to request deletion of their child’s private data 
records, or correction if records are inaccurate. This allows parents/guardians to 
request that their child’s location records be deleted, or to request a correction if 
their child’s location records are incomplete or incorrect.  
 Goals: user participation, data restriction 
 Privacy Principles: limiting collection & retention, accuracy, access 
4. The right for a parent/guardian to request acknowledgements through a 
communication channel when private information of their child is collected. This 
allows parents to set up a communication channel such as phone number or email 
address to receive acknowledgements there is an update pertaining to the collection 
of their child’s location records. This allows parents/guardians to keep track of how 
their child’s location information. 
 Goals: user participation 
 Privacy Principles: openness, access 
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5. The right to file complaints to toy company. If a parent/guardian believes that their 
child’s data has been mishandled in any way by the toy company or service provider, 
or if they believe that they have not acted in compliance with their policies, they are 
able to file complaints.  
 Goals: user participation 
 Privacy Principles: accountability, challenging compliance 
6. The right to find out where the child’s private data has been shared for purposes 
other than a game. This allows a parent/guardian to be notified if their child’s 
location records have been shared with another party for any purpose other than for 
a game.  
 Requirements: user participation 
 Privacy Principles: notice, purpose, openness 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the privacy requirements and concerns that parents and children 
observe in a mobile toy computing environment. We provide an overview of privacy 
issues, and next present a privacy threat model illustrating the privacy threats and 
requirements in a toy computing environment. Next we investigate the privacy 
considerations related to children as the primary user base and the issues parents face 
for implementing privacy controls. Additionally, we examine the privacy laws and 
regulations related to children’s online and mobile privacy and toy computing. Finally, 
based on these requirements we present six privacy constraints as a basis for the 
privacy access control model in Chapter 4. 
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  Privacy Access Control Chapter 4
Model 
In this chapter we developed an access control model with the concepts of toy, mobile 
services, devices, and guidance with related privacy entities: purpose, recipient, 
obligation, and retention for the toy computing environment. In this model, the 
parents/guardians are the owners of the data which is collected on their child (the data 
subject). Parents/guardians provide consent through access rules which allow their 
child’s data to be shared according to their preferences and privacy compliance. 
4.1 Core Access Control Model 
In the core access control model, a subject is a 3-tuple entity comprised of a toy, a 
device, and a mobile service. The mobile service may communicate with external 
entities over a network, such as other devices or Web services. The user who interacts 
with the subject is a child (data subject) who is associated with a real identity and a 
parent/guardian (data owner) who is in control of their data. For the purpose of this 
work we will use the same definition as SEC. 1302 of the US Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) [23], which defines a “child” as an individual under the age of 13 
years old. In this model access control decisions are based on permissions which are 
assigned by the parent, comprised of a list of rules for operations (read, write, etc.), and 
objects. Figure 4.1 illustrates the core access control model which allows parents to 
manage their privacy preferences for access to their child’s location data. The entities 
and properties of this model will be described in more detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 4.1 Core Access Control Model 
4.1.1 Definitions 
 TOYS = {to1, to2, …, tol} is a set of l toys in the system, where l > 0. As defined in 
Chapter 1, a toy is a physical object designed for play in a toy computing 
environment. 
 DEVICES = {d1, d2, …, dm} is a set of m mobile devices in the system, where m > 0. A 
mobile device is a smartphone or tablet PC.  
 MOBILE_SERVICES = {ms1, ms2, …, msn} is a set of n mobile services in the system, 
where n > 0. Mobile services communicate with mobile devices to provide services 
to run the toy computing game environment. Mobile services may request location 
or other data from the user u. 
 SUBJECTS = {s1, s2, …, sp} is a set of p subjects in the system, where p > 0. A subject s 
is a 3-tuple s = (toi, dj, msk), where toi ∈ TOYS, dj ∈ DEVICES and msk ∈ 
MOBILE_SERVICES. These entities are grouped together to form a subject because 
they are the core entities that comprise the toy computing system. 
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 USERS = {u1, u2, …, uq} is a set of q users in the system, where q > 0. Users are 
children aged 13 years or younger, based on [23]. 
 PARENTS = {pg1, pg2, … pgr} is a set of r parent/guardians in the system, where r > 0. 
 IDENTITIES = {id1, id2, … idt} is a set of t real identities in the system, where t > 0. A 
real identity is the actual identity of the user or parent/guardian and can be used to 
identify them outside of the system (e.g. name, address, phone number).  
 EXTERNAL_ENTITIES = {e1, e2,…eu} is a set of u external entities e, where u >= 0. 
External entities include external mobile services, Web services, servers, users, 
devices, etc. to which mobile services can connect and interact with over a network. 
External entities are listed under RECIPIENTS in a service’s policies, which will be 
detailed more in a later section. 
 OBJECTS = {o1, o2,…, og} is a set of g objects in the system, where g > 0. In this 
research work, objects are mainly location data. 
 OPS = {op1, op2, …, oph} is a set of h operations in the system, where h > 0. This 
research mainly focuses on the read operation, i.e. OPS = {read}. 
 PRMS = 2(OPS * OBJECTS) is a set of permissions in the system that approves a particular 
operation on one or more objects. 
4.1.2 Properties 
 parent_user: (pg: PARENTS)  (u: USERS) is a 1-to-n mapping of a parent/guardian 
pg to a user u who is their child. A parent/guardian can have multiple children. 
 user_parent: (u: USERS)  (pg: PARENTS) is a 1-to-1 mapping of a child user u to 
their parent/guardian. A child can only have one parent/guardian. 
 user_identity: (u: USERS | pg: PARENTS)  (id: IDENTITIES) is a one-to-one 
mapping of a user u or parent/guardian pg to their real identity id.  
 subject_user: (s: SUBJECTS)  (u: USERS) is a one-to-one mapping of a subject s 
onto an associated user u. When the user (child) is engaged in with the subject s in a 
toy computing environment, the 3-tuple subject: (toys, mobile device, mobile 
services) is associated with that user. 
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 toy_device: (to: TOYS)  (d: DEVICES) is a one-to-n mapping of a toy to onto an 
associated device d. Toys may have a list of related mobile apps (one-to-n mapping). 
Toys cannot run without a mobile device. 
 toy_service: (to: TOYS)  (ms: MOBILE_SERVICES) is an n-to-n mapping of a device 
d onto an associated mobile service ms. Toys cannot run without a mobile service 
attached with a device.  
 device_service: (d: DEVICE)  (ms: MOBILE_SERVICES) is an n-to-n mapping of a 
device d onto an associated mobile service ms. A toy can be mapped to multiple 
mobile services and vice versa. 
 subject_entities: (s: SUBJECTS)  (e: EXTERNAL_ENTITIES) is a one-to-n mapping of 
a subject s to a set of external entities {e1, e2, …, eu} they are connected to over a 
network, for example, a multi=player game. 
 assigned_permissions: (s: SUBJECTS)  2PRMS is a one-to-many mapping of a subject 
s to its associated permissions.  
Privacy-Sensitive Properties: 
 Child_location: (id: IDENTITIES)  (o: OBJECTS) is a one-to-many mapping of a 
child’s real identity id to the objects o they are associated with (i.e. location). In the 
toy computing environment, location data is particularly sensitive data because it is 
the location of the child using the toy. The location object is sensitive information 
when associated with the user’s real identity because it allows other entities to be 
aware of the child’s physical location. The motivation for this access control model is 
to protect this property from being shared with untrusted external entities. 
4.2 Privacy Access Control Model  
Traditional access control models make access decisions (permit/deny) based on low 
level operations, such as read and write, for describing a subject’s operation on an 
object. For example, user A is allowed to read file B, in which case user A is the subject, 
file B is the object, and read is the operation.  
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Figure 4.2 presents an extended access control model for privacy in a toy computing 
environment. This model shows the privacy access control model extended over top of 
the core access control model discussed in the previous section. In the privacy access 
control model, a request <Subject, Operation, Object, Purpose(s), Recipient(s)> as input, 
and a response <Decision, Obligation(s), Retention> as output, as well as an optional 
acknowledgement <Subject, Event> through a communication channel.  
 
Figure 4.2 Extended Privacy Access Control Model 
 Request is a 5-tuple <Subject, Operation, Object, Purpose(s), Recipient(s)>. It is an 
input for the privacy access control model. 
 Privacy Access Control Model consists of a core access control model, privacy-based 
entities (Purposes, Recipients, Obligations, Retention), and other entities (Events, 
CommunicationChannels, Timestamp, AccessLogs). The model processes an input 
request and generates a corresponding response, and an optional acknowledgement 
through a predefined communication channel. 
 Response is a 3-tuple <Decision, Obligation(s), Retention>, as an output of the model 
with a decision along with a set of obligations and retention policy for permitted 
access. 
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 Acknowledgement is a 2-tuple <Subject, Event>, which is an optional output of the 
model to send an acknowledgement of the event to a subject’s corresponding 
parent/guardian via a predefined communication channel. 
4.2.1 Privacy-Based Entities 
In our extension for preserving privacy, we have proposed four privacy-based entities: 
PURPOSES, RECIPIENTS, OBLIGATIONS, and RETENTION based on P3P [93]. These 
privacy-based entities are described as follows: 
 PURPOSES = {pp1, pp2, …, ppn} is a set of n purposes in the system. A subject must 
specify a set of purposes in the corresponding access request. A purpose can be 
described as different sub-purposes or combined into a “general” purpose in a 
hierarchical structure [151]. Figure 4.3 shows an example hierarchical structure to 
represent different purposes that could be related to toy computing. Different 
purposes can be generalized as the root element “AnyPurpose,” which is the most 
general purpose in the system. “AnyPurpose” can further be sub-classified as 
“PersonalPurpose,” “MarketingPurpose,” “AdministrativePurpose,” “GamePurpose” 
and “ResearchPurpose.” Each of these can further be sub-classified into more 
specific purposes. Please note that handling purpose hierarchy is outside the scope 
of this thesis.  
 
Figure 4.3 Purpose Hierarchy 
 RECIPIENTS = {rp1, rp2, …, rpn} is a set of n recipients of the collected object(s) 
belonging to the subjects/users in the system. Each collected object has a 
corresponding set of recipients. In the context of toy computing and P3P, recipients 
can be described as one of the following categories: 
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o Individual: The subject who made the request or an individual USER or 
SUBJECT in the system.  
o Group: a group of users (e.g. the group of USERS or SUBJECTS currently 
engaged in a toy computing game session). 
o Third-Party: an entity which does not belong to the system, but is 
constrained by and accountable to the object owner. This includes 
EXTERNAL_ENTITIES. 
o Anyone: Any subject or external entity. 
 OBLIGATIONS = {obl1, obl2, …, obln} is a set of n obligations of in the system that is 
necessary to be accepted after access permission is granted. The obligations 
describe the rules that a subject agrees to comply with after gaining the access 
permission. Obligations are generally bound to legislation and agreements, for 
example, “No disclosure to an unauthorized third party.” 
 RETENTIONS = {rt1, rt2, …, rtn} is a set of n retention policies in the system to be 
enforced after permission is granted. Each object may have a corresponding 
retention policy to enforce the duration for how long it may be used or retained. It is 
recommended that a child’s location data be retained only for the time necessary 
for the stated purpose. Based on the context of P3P [93], the retention policy can be 
described as one of the following categories: 
o No-retention: the requested object is not retained for more than a brief 
period of time, after which it must be destroyed without being logged, 
archived or otherwise stored by the recipients. 
o Stated-purpose: the requested object is retained for the time required to 
meet the stated purpose and will be discarded as soon as possible after the 
purpose is satisfied. 
o Legal-requirement: the requested object is retained to meet a stated purpose 
(as required by law or liability under applicable law). 
o Business-practices: the requested object is retained under the stated 
business practices. 
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o Indefinitely: the requested object is retained for an indeterminate period of 
time. 
4.2.2 Other Related Entities 
 DECISIONS = {permit, deny} is a Boolean value for an access permitted or denied 
decision e.g. permit = TRUE and deny = FALSE. 
 PRIVACY_RULES ⊆ SUBJECTS x USERS x OPS x OBJECTS x PURPOSES x RECIPIENTS x 
DECISIONS x OBLIGATIONS x RETENTIONS is a set of privacy rules in the system. For 
a positive authorization rule (DECISIONS = permit), the rule states what subject is 
allowed to perform which operation on which object for what purposes, to which 
recipients, and under what obligations and retention. 
 CHILD_DATA ⊆ SUBJECTS x OBJECTS x USERS is a one-to-many mapping between 
child users, the subjects they interact with, and the objects belonging to them. It is a 
3-tuple <s,o,u> where s ∈ SUBJECTS, o ∈ OBJECTS, and u ∈ USERS. This is all of the 
data associated with a child during their interactions with toy computing. 
 OWNERS ⊆ PARENTS x [SUBJECTS x OBJECTS x USERS] is a one-to-many mapping 
between parents pg and child data (subject s, object o, and user u,). It is a 4-tuple 
<pg, s,o,u>, where pg ∈ PARENTS, s ∈ SUBJECTS, o ∈ OBJECTS, u ∈ USERS, and 
<s,o,u> ∈ CHILD_DATA. The set of owners in the system refers to whom the object 
belongs. In the case of mobile toy computing, the owner of a child’s data is the 
child’s parent/guardian.  
 COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS = {c1, c2, …, cn} is the set of communication channels 
in the system. It is used to specify how the acknowledgement is sent to a 
parent/guardian, for example, email, phone, etc.  
 TIMESTAMP is a set of positive integers Z+, representing the system time in partial 
order. 
 ACCESS_LOGS = {e1, e2, …, en} is a set of n events to keep track of access control log 
history of all events occurred in the system. Initially, the system has an empty access 
log, which is populated as events occur. EVENTS are all possible incidents that occur 
in the system. An event contains a TIMESTAMP attribute to record the system time 
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when the event occurred. All events that occur in the system are stored in 
ACCESS_LOGS ⊆ EVENTS, which are classified into four different types: 
o EVENTS ⊆ SUBJECTS x USERS x OPS x OBJECTS x PURPOSES x RECIPIENTS x 
DECISIONS x OBLIGATIONS x RETENTIONS x TIMESTAMP is an event of an 
access request and the corresponding response.  
o EVENTS ⊆ PARENTS x ACCESS_LOGS x TIMESTAMP is an event of an 
acknowledgement. 
o EVENTS ⊆ SUBJECTS x PRIVACY_RULES x PRIVACY_RULES x TIMESTAMP is an 
event of a change in privacy rules or restrictions. 
o EVENTS ⊆ PARENTS x COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS x TIMESTAMP is an 
event of a change in an acknowledgement communication channel. 
 OBJECT_TYPES = {type1, type2, …, typen} is a set of n types of categories of objects. 
While we are concerned with location data, some relevant categories are as follows, 
as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
o AnyLocationObjectType: a general description of any location object type. 
o Absolute Location: is the location expressed in a range or exact GPS 
coordinates, latitude and longitude. For the purpose of this thesis, we are 
concerned with absolute location. As defined in Chapter 2, the absolute 
location can be expressed as coarse (GPS-based, approximate location), or 
fine (network-based, precise location) [61].  
o Relative Location: is the location relative to another entity as a reference 
point. Relative location can be expressed as the distance between User A and 
User B, User A and Device C, or User A and Location D.  
o Type of Location: is the location expressed in a predefined category. Some 
examples include home, office, street, mall, or restaurant. 
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Figure 4.4 Location Object Types 
4.2.3 Extended properties 
 object_user: (o: OBJECTS)  (u: USERS, s: SUBJECTS) is a mapping of a child’s data 
object, onto its associated user u. Formally, object_user(o) = <s, o, u> where <s, o, u> 
∈ CHILD_DATA. 
 user_objects: (u: USERS)  2OBJECTS is a one-to-many mapping of a user u to all of 
the objects o it is associated with. Formally, user_object(u) = { <s,o,u>1,  <s,o,u>2, …, 
<s,o,u>n}, where o ∈ OBJECTS, s ∈ SUBJECTS, , u ∈ USERS and <s,o,u> ∈ CHILD_DATA. 
 object_owner: (o: OBJECTS)  (pg: PARENTS) is a mapping of a child data <s,o,u> 
onto its owner (i.e. parent pg). Formally, object_owner(o) = (pg, <s,o,u>) where (pg, 
<s,o,u>) ∈ OWNERS.  
 owner_objects: (pg: PARENTS) 2OBJECTS is a mapping of a parent/guardian to all of 
the objects that the parent/guardian owns. Formally, owner_objects(pg) = {(pg, 
<s,o,u>)1, (pg, <s,o,u>)2, …, (pg, <s,o,u>)n } where (pg, <s,o,u>) ∈ OWNERS. 
 type: (o: OBJECTS)  (oType: OBJECT_TYPES) is a one-to-one mapping of an object 
o to its object type oType. Each object is associated with an object type in the 
LocationObjectType categories, which belongs to OBJECT_TYPES. 
 restrict: (rule1: PRIVACY_RULES)  (rule2: PRIVACY_RULES) is a one-to-one 
mapping to map rule1 onto rule2 that both rule1 and rule2 are elements of 
PRIVACY_RULES. This is used to restrict the privacy rules by specifying the purposes, 
recipients, obligations, and retention for an access. 
 comm_channel: (pg: PARENTS)  (c: COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) is a one-to-
one mapping to map parent/guardian pg onto his/her communication channel c. 
This is used to determine how an acknowledgement is sent through a 
communication medium such as email or telephone. Communication channels are 
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available to a child user’s parents/guardians if they wish to receive 
acknowledgements. 
 acknowledgement: (pg ∈ PARENTS, c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, e ∈ 
ACCESS_LOGS)  BOOLEAN is a notification mechanism to a parent/guardian pg 
corresponding to an event e that occurs in the system. The acknowledgement 
should be sent through a communication channel c defined by the parent/guardian. 
If the parent/guardian has setup an acknowledgement communication channel, the 
function will return TRUE. If the parent/guardian has not setup an acknowledgement 
communication channel, or opted not to receive any acknowledgement, the 
function will return FALSE.  
 log: (e: EVENTS)  ACCESS_LOGS is a one-to-one mapping of an instance of an 
event e that occurs in the system onto an audit trail ACCESS_LOGS. When an event 
occurs, the ACCESS_LOGS will keep a record of the related details of the event. 
Formally, log(e) = ACCESS_LOGS ∪ e. 
4.3 Access Control Authorization Properties in the Model 
4.3.1 Basic Access Authorization Property 
 basic_access: SUBJECTS x OPS x OBJECTS  DECISIONS 
 basic_access(s, op, o) = permit if subject s can access object o using operation op, 
      = deny otherwise. 
A subject s is permitted to perform an operation op on object o only if there exists a 
permission assigned to s such that the permission authorizes the performance of op 
on o: 
s ∈ SUBJECTS, o ∈ OBJECTS, op ∈ OPS,  
basic_access(s, op, o) = permit 
 
∃ s: SUBJECTS, p: PRMS, 
 p ∈ assigned_permissions(s) ∧ (op,o) ∈ p  
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4.3.2 Privacy Access Authorization Property 
 privacy_access: SUBJECTS|PARENTS x USERS x OPS x OBJECTS x PURPOSES x 
RECIPIENTS  DECISIONS x OBLIGATIONS x RETENTIONS. Based on the 
PRIVACY_RULES, the privacy access is used to determine whether a privacy access is 
permitted or denied with related obligation(s) and a retention policy is returned. 
This takes into account the object, user, and subject who invokes access, the 
operation, the purpose(s) for the request, and the recipient(s) of the collected 
object. 
 privacy_access (pg, u, op, o, _, _}) , where user is parent’s child, operation is read, 
= (permit, _, _). Parents have the right to access their child’s objects without any 
restrictions. 
 privacy_access (s, u, op, o, {pp1, pp2,…,ppj}, {rp1, rp2, …, rpk})  
= (permit, {obl1, obl2, …,oblm}, rt) if and only if: (s, u, op, o, {pp1, pp2,…,ppj}, {rp1, rp2, 
…, rpk}, permit, {obl1, obl2, …,oblm}, rt) ∈ PRIVACY_RULES 
A subject can access an object o using an operation op for a set of purposes in {pp1, 
pp2,…,ppj} to a set of recipients in {rp1, rp2, …, rpk}, and following a set of obligations 
in {obl1, obl2, …,oblm} and a retention policy rt. 
 
= (deny, ∅, ∅) if and only if there is no match in the privacy rule or there is a deny 
rule: (s, u, op, o, {pp1, pp2,…,ppj}, {rp1, rp2, …, rpk}, deny, ∅, ∅) ∈ PRIVACY_RULES 
4.4 Privacy Constraints 
In Chapter 3, we defined a set of privacy requirements for toy computing based on 
PIPEDA and toy safety guidelines. In this section, we interpret the privacy requirements 
as constraints in the extended access control model and illustrate the constraint rules. 
Constraints are used to specify the specific requirements that need to be enforced in 
the system. The toy computing privacy requirements are presented as the following 
constraints: 
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 Constraint 1: The right for a parent/guardian to request restrictions on the use or 
disclosure of private information of their child.  
 Constraint 2: The right for a parent/guardian to access, copy, and inspect collected 
records on their child. 
 Constraint 3: The right for a parent/guardian to request deletion or correction if 
records are inaccurate. 
 Constraint 4: The right for a parent/guardian to request acknowledgements through 
a communication channel when private information of their child is collected. 
 Constraint 5: The right to file complaints to toy company. 
 Constraint 6: The right for a parent/guardian to find out where private data has 
been shared for purposes other than a game. 
4.4.1 Constraint 1: The right to for a parent/guardian to request restrictions 
on the use or disclosure of private information of their child 
Description: the set of privacy rules in the system is (a) updated, (b) acknowledged, and 
(c) logged if and only if (1) a parent/guardian pg applies a restriction on his/her child’s 
object o, and (2) the restrictions include a set of purposes; a set or recipients; a set of 
obligations and a retention policy on a mobile service (subject s) to perform an 
operation op on object o: 
∀ s ∈ SUBJECTS, u ∈ USERS, op ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS, pg ∈ PARENTS 
PP, PP’ ⊆ PURPOSES, RP, RP’ ⊆ RECIPIENTS, OBL, OBL’ ⊆ OBLIGATIONS,  
rt, rt’ ∈ RETENTIONS, rule ∈ PRIVACY_RULES 
pg ∈ user_parent(u) ∧ u ∈ object_user(o) ⇒ pg ∈ object_owner(o)  (1)  
∧ rule = (s, u, op, o, PP, RP, permit, OBL, rt), 
∧ (PP ≠ PP’ ∨ RP ≠ RP’ ∨ OBL ≠ OBL’ ∨ rt ≠ rt’) 
∧ restrict(s, u, op, o, PP, RP, OBL, rt) = (s, u, op, o, PP’, RP’, OBL’, rt’)  (2) 
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⇒ 
∃ c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, t ∈ TIMESTAMP, e ∈ EVENTS,  
rule’ = (s, u, op, o, PP’, RP’, permit, OBL’, rt) ∈ PRIVACY_RULES, 
PRIVACY_RULES = PRIVACY_RULES /rule, 
PRIVACY_RULES = PRIVACY_RULES ∪ rule’,      (a) 
e = (s, rule, rule’, t), c = com_channel(object_owner(o)), 
acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e),      (b) 
log(e)           (c) 
Proof: The proof consists of two parts, (i) showing Constraint 1 is necessary, and (ii) 
showing Constraint 1 is sufficient. 
Constraint 1 is necessary according to our privacy rule 1, that a parent/guardian has the 
right to request restrictions on the use or disclosure of the location information of their 
child. Therefore, the parent/guardian has the right to setup restrictions on the access 
purposes, recipients, obligations, and retention of the location data of their child. 
Therefore a set of privacy rules in the system governing the access of object o is 
updated if an only if the parent/guardian pg applies a restriction on his/her child’s 
object. The restrictions include a set of purposes; a set of recipients; a set of obligations 
and a retention policy on a subject which performs an operation op to object o. 
To show that Constraint 1 is sufficient, we know that every parent/guardian pg owns a 
set of objects belonging to their child owner_object(pg), where 0 ≤ 
|owner_objects(pg)| ≤ n and n ≥ 1. For owner_objects(pg) = ∅, the parent/guardian pg 
does not have any permission right to request update of any restrictions on any private 
information. For owner_objects(pg) ≠ ∅, the parent/guardian pg would be granted the 
right to make a restriction request on object o which belongs to owner_objects(pg) only. 
Before the restriction request at time t, the privacy policy states that when any subject 
A Location Privacy Model and Framework for Mobile Toy Computing  
- 91 - 
 
performs an operation op on object o with the purposes PP and recipients RP, it is 
permitted with obligations OBL and retention policy rt. In the system, there may be 
events which occur at t’ where t’ ≤ t, 0 ≤ |e| where e = (s, u, op, o, PP, RP, permit, OBL, 
rt, t’) for any subject s. After the update of privacy rules at time t, the privacy policy 
states that any when subject performs an operation op on object o with the purposes 
PP’ and recipients RP’, it is permitted with obligations OBL’ and retention policy rt’. The 
privacy access rules in the system are thus updated with a deletion of an entry (s, u, op, 
o, PP, RP, permit, OBL, rt), and an insertion of an entry (s, u, op, o, PP’, RP’, permit, OBL’, 
rt’) in the system privacy policy. Therefore, after time t, the access logs must not contain 
any event such as: ¬(∃e = (s, u, op, o, PP, RP, permit, OBL, rt, t’)) where t’ > t. 
4.4.2 Constraint 2: The right for a parent/guardian to access, copy and 
inspect collected private records on their child 
Description: The privacy access is (a) allowed, (b) acknowledged, and (c) logged if and 
only if, a parent/guardian exists (1) to perform an operation “read” or “copy” (2) to 
his/her own child’s object o which is a type of “AnyLocationObjectType.” 
∀ s ∈ SUBJECTS, u ∈ USERS, op ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS, pg ∈ PARENTS 
∧ op = (“read” ∨ “copy”)        (1) 
pg ∈ user_parent(u) ∧ u ∈ object_user(o) ⇒ pg ∈ object_owner(o)   
∧ o ∈ owner_object(pg) ∧ type(o) = “AnyLocationObjectType”   (2) 
⇒ 
∃ c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, t ∈ TIMESTAMP, e ∈ EVENTS,  
privacy_access(s, u, op, o, _, _) = (allow, _, _),     (a) 
e = (s, u, op, o, _, _, allow, _,  _, t), c = com_channel(object_owner(o)),  
acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e),      (b) 
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log(e)           (c) 
Proof: the proof consists of two parts: i) showing Constraint 2 is necessary, and ii) 
showing Constraint 2 is sufficient. 
Constraint 2 is necessary according to our privacy constraint 2, that a parent/guardian 
has the right to access, copy, and inspect collected location records on their child. 
Therefore, the privacy access is allowed, acknowledged, and logged if a parent/guardian 
pg requests an operation “read” or “copy” to his/her child’s own object o which is a type 
of “AnyLocationObjectType.” 
To show that Constraint 2 is sufficient, we know that every parent/guardian pg owns a 
set of objects owner_object(pg), where 0 ≤ |owner_objects(pg)| ≤ n and n ≥ 1. For 
owner_objects(pg) = ∅, the parent/guardian pg does not have permission to access, 
inspect, or copy any location records. For owner_objects(pg) ≠ ∅, the parent/guardian 
pg may also have no permission to access, inspect, and copy his/her child’s location 
records if and only if ¬(∃ o ∈ owner_objects(pg) ⇒ type(o) = “AnyLocationObjectType”). 
Thus, the parent/guardian pg can only have permission to access, inspect, and copy 
his/her child’s medical records (o ∈ owner_objects(pg) | type(o) = 
“AnyLocationObjectType” ∧ owner_objects(pg) ) ≠ ∅). When the parent/guardian pg 
acquires the access permission, this event e will be logged and stored in the system. If 
the object owner (parent pg) has set up an acknowledgement channel c, an 
acknowledgement of the event e will be sent via c.  
4.4.3 Constraint 3: The right to request deletion or correction if private 
records are inaccurate or unwanted 
The correction of location records action corresponds to the action “correct” in the 
system. The operation “correct” means that there is a trusted third party to update the 
information for the subject. 
Description: the privacy access is (a) allowed, (b) acknowledged, and (c) logged, if and 
only if a parent/guardian pg is (1) permitted to perform an operation “correct” or 
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“delete” (2) to his/her child’s own object o which is a type of “AnyLocationObjectType” 
(3) for the purpose of “CorrectInaccurateLocation” or “DeleteUnwantedLocation.” 
∀ s ∈ SUBJECTS, u ∈ USERS, op ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS, PP ∈ PURPOSES, pg ∈ PARENTS 
pg ∈ parent_user(u) ∧ u ∈ object_user(o) ⇒ pg ∈ object_owner(o)    
∧ op = (“correct”|”delete”)        (1) 
∧ o ∈ owner_object(pg) ∧ type(o) = “AnyLocationObjectType”   (2) 
∧ PP = (“CorrectInaccurateLocation”|”DeleteUnwantedLocation”)   (3) 
⇒ 
∃ c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, t ∈ TIMESTAMP, e ∈ EVENTS,  
privacy_access(pg, u, op, o, PP,_) = (permit, _, _),     (a) 
e = (s, u, op, o, PP, _, permit, _, _, t), c = com_channel(object_owner(o)),  
acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e),      (b) 
log(e)           (c) 
Proof: the proof consists of two parts: i) showing Constraint 3 is necessary, and ii) 
showing Constraint 3 is sufficient. 
Constraint 3 is necessary according to our privacy rule 3, that a parent/guardian has the 
right to request the correction of any inaccurate location information or deletion of any 
unwanted location information pertaining to their child. Therefore, the privacy access is 
allowed, acknowledged, and logged if a parent/guardian pg requests an operation 
“correct” on his/her own object o for the purpose of “CorrectInaccurateLocation” or 
“DeleteUnwantedLocation.” 
To show that Constraint 3 is sufficient, we know that every parent/guardian pg owns a 
set of objects owner_object(pg), where 0 ≤ |owner_objects(pg)| ≤ n and n ≥ 1. For 
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owner_objects(pg) = ∅, the parent/guardian pg does not have any permission to correct 
or delete any location records. For owner_objects(pg) ≠ ∅, the parent/guardian pg 
would be granted the right to make a correction request on any of his/her own child’s 
objects o ∈ owner_objects(pg) with the type of “AnyLocationObjectType” which belongs 
to owner_objects(pg) with the purpose “CorrectInaccurateLocation” or 
“DeleteUnwatnedLocation.” Thus, the parent/guardian pg can only have a permission to 
correct his/her own child’s location records (of which they are the parent/guardian is 
the owner): (o ∈ owner_objects(pg) | type(o) = “AnyLocationObjectType” ∧ 
owner_objects(pg) ≠ ∅ ∧ PP = {“CorrectInaccurateLocation” | 
”DeleteUnwantedLocation”}). When the parent/guardian pg acquires the access 
permission, this event e will be logged and stored in the system. If the object owner 
(parent pg) has set up an acknowledgement channel c, an acknowledgement of the 
event e will be sent via c. 
4.4.4 Constraint 4: The right for a parent/guardian to request 
acknowledgements through a communication channel when private 
information of their child is collected 
Description: the privacy access is (a) allowed, (b) acknowledged, and (c) logged, if and 
only if a parent/guardian pg is (1) permitted to perform an operation “update” (2) to the 
parent’s acknowledgement communication channel c’. 
∀ pg ∈ PARENTS, op ∈ OPS, c, c’ ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, 
∧ op = (“update”)         (1) 
∧ c ∈ com_channel(pg) ∧ c ≠ c’       (2) 
⇒ 
∃ t ∈ TIMESTAMP, e ∈ EVENTS,  
privacy_access(pg, u, op, _, _) = (permit, _, _),     (a) 
com_channel(pg) = c’, e = (pg, c’, t),  
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acknowledgement(pg, c’, e),        (b) 
log(e)           (c) 
Proof: the proof consists of two parts: i) showing Constraint 4 is necessary, and ii) 
showing Constraint 4 is sufficient. 
Constraint 4 is necessary according to our privacy Constraint 4, which iterates that the 
parent/guardian of the child user has the right to request communication of information 
privacy notification events through a specified communication channel, for example, to 
a particular e-mail address or phone number. Therefore, the privacy access is allowed, 
acknowledged, and logged if and only if a parent/guardian pg requests an operation 
“update” on the acknowledgement communication channel. 
To show that Constraint 4 is sufficient, we know that every location record owner 
should receive an acknowledgement notification if any event occurs in the system. 
Before time t, any events in the system about object o must be sent through the 
communication channel c defined by the owner, where object_owner(o) = pg. For any 
events e which occur on object o at time t’ where t’ > t, the location record owner can 
only receive an acknowledgement notification through the acknowledgement channel 
c’: 
∀e = (_, _, o, _, _, _, _, _, t’), e ∈ ACCESS_LOGS ∧ t’ ≥ t 
⇒ ¬ acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e). 
4.4.5 Constraint 5: The Right to File Complaints to Toy Company 
Description: the privacy access is (a) allowed, (b) acknowledged, and (c) logged, if and 
only if a parent/guardian pg is (1) permitted to perform an operation “file” to a 
complaint record (2) on his/her own object o which is a type of “complaintRecord.” 
∀ pg ∈ PARENTS, u ∈ USERS, op ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS,       
∧ op = (“file”)          (1) 
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∧ c ∈ owner_object(pg) ∧ type(o) = “ComplaintRecord”    (2) 
⇒ 
∃ c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, t ∈ TIMESTAMP, e ∈ EVENTS,  
privacy_access(pg, op, o, _, _) = (permit, _, _),     (a) 
e = (pg, op, o, _, _, permit, _, _, t), c = com_channel(object_owner(o)),  
acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e),      (b) 
log(e)           (c) 
Proof: the proof consists of two parts: i) showing Constraint 5 is necessary, and ii) 
showing Constraint 5 is sufficient. 
Constraint 5 is necessary according to our privacy constraint 5, that a parent/guardian 
has the right to complain to the toy company regarding how they handle their child’s 
location data. Therefore, the privacy access is allowed, acknowledged, and logged if and 
only if subject s performs an operation “file” on the complaint record that the 
parent/guardian owns.  
To show that Constraint 5 is sufficient, we know that every parent/guardian pg can 
perform the operation “file” on objects that they own with the type “ComplaintRecord.” 
For all the objects that parent/guardian pg owns, owner_objects(s) where 0 ≤ 
|owner_objects(s)| ≤ n and n ≥ 1, if none of the object types is “ComplaintRecord,” the 
parent/guardian pg does not have the permission to file a complaint. If the object type is 
“ComplaintRecord,” then parent/guardian pg has the permission to file a complaint. 
When the parent/guardian pg successfully files a complaint record, this event e will be 
logged and stored in the system. If the object owner (parent/guardian pg), has set up an 
acknowledgement channel c, an acknowledgement of the event e will be sent via c. 
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4.4.6 Constraint 6: The right to find out where private information has been 
shared for purposes other than a game 
In order to describe constraint 6, we first introduce a preliminary constraint 6a, which 
states that recipients must be specified if the purpose of access is other than for a game. 
Preliminary Constraint 6a: Recipients must be specified if the purpose of access 
is other than for a game. Description: for any subject s (1) performs a “read” 
operation op on an object o (2) for a purpose PP other than “game” (a) then the 
recipients must not be empty or access is denied. 
∀ s ∈ SUBJECTS, pg ∈ PARENTS, u ∈ USERS, op ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS, PP ⊆ 
PURPOSES, 
u ∈ subject_user(s)           
∧ op = (“read”),        (1) 
∧ PP ∩ {“Game”} = ∅        (2) 
⇒ 
(RP ≠ ∅, privacy_access(s, u, op, o, PP, RP) = (_, _, _))     
⌵ (RP = ∅, privacy_access(s, u, op, o, PP, RP) = (deny, ∅, ∅))  (a) 
Proof: Preliminary constraint 6a is necessary because in order for a 
parent/guardian to find out where his/her child’s private information has been 
shared, it is essential to distinguish the access purposes and result recipients. 
Thus, if a “read” operation is requested by a subject who is not the user or 
owner of the location data, the recipients in the request message should not be 
an empty set when the purpose is other than for the game. Otherwise, access is 
denied. This can guarantee the access log could record to whom the information 
has been shared corresponding to the access request. Therefore Constraint 6a is 
necessary according to the implication of our privacy constraint 6, a parent has 
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the right to find out where the location of their child has been shared for the 
purpose other than the game. 
Description: the privacy access is (a) allowed, (b) acknowledged, and (c) logged, if and 
only if (1) a parent pg (2) performs a “findDisclosure” operation on his/her own child’s 
object o (3) which is a type of “anyLocationObjectType.” 
∀ s ∈ SUBJECTS, pg ∈ PARENTS, u ∈ USERS, op1, op2 ∈ OPS, o ∈ OBJECTS, PP ⊆ 
PURPOSES, RP ⊆ Recipients, t1, t2 ∈ TIMESTAMP, 
(PP ∩ {“Game”} = ∅ ⇒ RP ≠ ∅)            (Preliminary Constraint 6a) 
pg ∈ user_parent(u) ∧ u ∈ object_user(o) ⇒ pg ∈ object_owner(o)   
∧ op1 = “findDisclosure” ∧ op2 = “read”      (1) 
∧ o ∈ owner_objects(pg) ∧ type(o) = “anyLocationObjectType”   (2) 
∀ (pg, op2, o, PP, RP, _, _, _, t2) ∈ ACCESS_LOGS where t1≥t2 
⇒ 
∃ c ∈ COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS, e ∈ EVENTS,  
privacy_access(pg, op1, o, _, _) = (permit, _, _),     (a) 
e = (pg, op1, o, _, _, permit, _, _, t1), c = com_channel(object_owner(o)),  
acknowledgement(object_owner(o), c, e),      (b) 
log(e)           (c) 
Proof: the proof consists of two parts: i) showing Constraint 6 is necessary, and ii) 
showing Constraint 6 is sufficient. 
Constraint 6 is necessary according to our privacy constraint 6 that a parent/guardian 
has the right to find out where the private information of their child has been shared for 
the purpose other than the game. Therefore, privacy access is allowed, acknowledged, 
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and logged if a parent/guardian pg requests to find out where their own child’s location 
record object o has been shared for the purpose(s) other than the game. 
To show that constraint 6 is sufficient, we first make use of the Preliminary Constraint 
6a. From Preliminary Constraint 6a, we know that for any request on performing the 
“read” operation on object o, which the requester is not the owner of the object, with 
the purpose other than the “game,” the recipients must be specified. With a set of 
events in the system to record any “read” operation request, we can find out who has 
disclosed the private records to which recipients. Therefore, the object owner pg is 
allowed to perform a “findDisclosure” operation to find out how their child’s location 
records are shared other than for the purpose of the game. This operation returns all 
the events in the systems where any subject performs a “read” operation on object o, 
with purposes other than “game,” and includes the recipients, access decision, 
obligations, retention, and time. 
Before the subject pg performs a “findDisclosure” operation on object o at the time t1, 
the access logs may have contained a set of events that a subject s performed an op2 = 
“read” operation on object o, where object_owner(o) = pg. If no such event ever 
occurred, the system will return an empty set to parent/guardian pg. In the case of any 
event (s, op2, o, PP, RP, _, _, _, t2) which exists in the access logs, this means that subject 
s must have performed a “read” operation on object o if and only if s performed the 
operation at time t2, where t1 ≥ t2. Therefore, the system will return the events {e ∈ 
ACCESS_LOGS | e = (s, op2, o, PP, RP, _, _, _, t2) ∧ object_owner(o) = pg ∧ t1 ≥ t2 } to the 
subject if and only if PP ∩ {“Game”} = ∅ and RP ≠ ∅. As a result, parent/guardian pg can 
find out where his/her child’s location data has been shared for purposes other than the 
game if and only if {e ∈ ACCESS_LOGS, where  e = (s, op2, o, PP, RP, _, _, _, t2) ∧ 
object_owner(o) = pg ∧ t1 ≥ t2 } ≠ ∅.  
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4.5 Algorithm for Access Control Decision with Privacy Enforcement 
This section presents an algorithm for access control decisions with privacy 
enforcement. 
4.5.1 Prerequisites 
A privacy model proposed by Rezgui et al. [152] has a three-dimensional privacy 
infrastructure: user privacy, services privacy, and data privacy. Based on this model, the 
access control model allows parents/guardians to specify their privacy preferences on 
how the service provider can use, store, and disclose the location information of their 
children. The privacy access control model interprets privacy data based on a set of 
restriction rules set up by the parent/guardian. Our model assumes that a child’s 
location data objects are associated with a data privacy profile. In our extended access 
control model, we provide a primary mechanism to allow parent/guardians to express 
restrictions for their child’s location data objects. We assume that whenever a subject 
requests access to a location object, the restriction in the privacy rule has a 
corresponding rule in the data privacy profile. 
4.5.2 Privacy Rules 
Here is the general privacy rule (based on PIPEDA basic principle and Power et al.): 
 With Parent/guardian’s consent, 
ALLOW mobile service as part of [Subject] 
 To perform [Operation] on location data [Object] 
 Only for legitimate [Purposes] to [Recipients] 
 And then carry out [Obligations] and [Retentions]. 
 DENY otherwise. 
The Subject, Operation, and Object are defined in the core access control model in 
Section 4.1.1. Purposes, Recipients, Obligations and Retentions are the privacy entities 
defined in Section 4.2.1. The privacy rule can be described as follows: 
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A subject has access to an object, only if the access is authorized by the core 
access control. Also, the subject needs to specify the purpose(s) of the access 
and the recipient(s) of the result of the access operation. The purpose(s) and the 
recipient(s) must be legitimate according to the access of the object defined by 
the owner or an authority such as the government. Thus, obligations and a 
retention policy will be returned as a response message if the access is allowed. 
The subject must also comply with the obligations and the retention policy. The 
access request will be denied otherwise. 
The privacy access control model will address all of these requirements. In section 4.5.3, 
we present an access control decision making algorithm for the privacy access control 
model. 
4.5.2.1 Policy Rule Creation 
Parents can create policy rules for their child’s data through the process illustrated in 
Figure 4.5. This process is done through a mobile web interface on the device, which will 
be described more thoroughly in Chapter 5. The policy rule creation process starts with 
the initialization phase, in which first step is for the parent to configure themselves as 
the child (user)’s parent/guardian. By mapping a parent/guardian to a child user, the 
parent/guardian becomes the owner of the child’s data. Next, the parent/guardian 
consents to the End User License Agreement (EULA) on behalf of the child, agreeing to 
the terms of the mobile service. Lastly, the parent/guardian sets their communication 
channel (e.g. email address) and preferences for receiving acknowledgements of privacy 
updates related to their child’s data. Next, the parent/guardian can create policy rules 
according to their preferences for how their child’s data can be collected and shared. 
This model uses positive authorization, in which parents define the rules for what is 
allowed. To create a policy rule, the parent/guardian first specifies the subject (their 
child), the object (e.g. absolute location data), the allowed operation (e.g. read), the 
allowed purposes (e.g. game purpose), and the allowed recipients (e.g. other users in-
game). Next, the parent/guardian specifies the obligations and retention policies that 
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the recipient must comply to in order to receive the data object. After this rule is 
created, the Step 2 process can be repeated to create as many rules as desired. 
 
Figure 4.5 Policy Rule Creation Process 
4.5.3 Algorithm for Access Control Decisions with Privacy Enforcement 
The access control decision algorithm in the privacy access control model is illustrated as 
follows: 
While(true){ 
//Step 1: Get access requests from the subject 
If request (SUBJECTS s, USERS u, OBJECTS o, OPS op, PURPOSES {pp1, 
…, ppn}, RECIPIENTS {rp1, …, rpm}){ 
 
//Step 2: Process the Request 
  
//Step 2.1: Check object user and ownership 
USERS u = object_user(o) 
 OWNERS owr = object_owner(o) 
 
 //Step 2.2 Retrieve corresponding privacy rules  
PRIVACY_RULES rule = get_privacy_rules(s, u, op, o, 
{pp1,…,ppn}, {rp1,…,rpm}) 
 
 //Step 2.3 Check acknowledgement communication channel 
 COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS c = com_channel(owr) 
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//Step 3: Make decision 
DECISIONS d = deny 
 
//Step 3.1 Check permission from core access control model 
PRMS p = assigned_permission(s) 
 
//Step 3.2 Check legitimate purposes 
if ( p ∧ rule.pp = {pp1, …, ppn}){ 
 
//Step 3.3 Check legitimate recipients 
  if(rule.rp = {rp1, …, rpm}){ 
    
//Step 3.4 Final decision 
   d = rule.decisions 
   OBLIGATIONS {obl1,…,oblp} = rule.obligations 
   RETENTIONS rt = rule.retentions 
  } 
 } 
 
//Step 4: Return response and acknowledgement 
if(d = permit){ 
 
//Step 4.1 Return allow, obligations, retention policy 
 response(d, {obl1,…,oblp},rt) 
  
//Step 4.2 Send acknowledgement (if applicable) 
EVENTS e = (s, u, op, o, {pp1,…,ppn}, {rp1,…,rpm}, d, 
{obl1,…,oblp}, rt, time) 
Acknowledgement ack = Acknowledgement(owr, c, e) 
} 
Else{ 
//Step 4.1 Return deny, null, null 
 response(d, null, null) 
  
//Step 4.2 Send acknowledgement (if applicable) 
EVENTS e = (s, u, op, o, {pp1,…,ppn}, {rp1,…,rpm}, d, null, 
null, time) 
Acknowledgement ack = Acknowledgement(owr, c, e) 
} 
 





The access control decision process is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6 Access Control Decision Process 
In this mode, a subject first requests access to a user’s location information, specifying 
the subject, object, operation, purpose(s), and recipient(s). After receiving the request, 
the privacy access control model processes the request as follows: (1) checks the owner 
of the requested object, then (2) retrieves the corresponding privacy rules from the 
system, and (3) checks the acknowledgment communication channel for the subject 
owner. Next, the decision is made by (1) checking the permissions from the core access 
control model, (2) checking the allowed purposes and then (3) checking allowed 
recipients. The final decision is made and the system returns a response and 
acknowledgement. The response can be either permit, along with the obligations and 
retention policy, or deny. If applicable, the acknowledgement is sent to the subject 
owner through the predefined acknowledgement channel, and contains the subject and 
event. Lastly, the model records all of the above in the audit logs.  
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4.6 Example Scenarios 
Referring to a toy computing scenario, in this section we present some example 
scenarios using Tek Recon, Sphero, and ToyMail (see Chapter 2) to illustrate some 
possible privacy access control rules.  
4.6.1 Scenario 1 
Scenario 1: A parent may access his child’s location records collected by Sphero. He may 
update his contact information for receiving acknowledgements. This scenario is 
illustrated in  
 
Figure 4.7 Example Scenario 1: Sphero 
Privacy rules: 
S1.1: A parent/guardian (data owner) is allowed to read or copy his child’s location 
record 
(Parent/Guaridan, read, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _) 
(Parent/Guardian, copy, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _) 
S1.2: A parent is allowed to update his/her contact information 
(owner, update, ContactInformation, _, _, permit, _, _) 
4.6.2 Scenario 2 
Scenario 2: As shown in Figure 4.8, a child using Tek Recon has been connected to a 
mobile service using location services in a toy computing environment to share his 
location to his friends and see their locations in return. Once the service receives the 
user’s location record, the service may read and disclose the location information to 
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other players for the purpose of the game, and delete the records immediately after the 
game is complete.  
 
Figure 4.8 Example Scenario 3: Tek Recon 
Privacy rules: 
S2.1. A service is allowed to read the absolute location record of a user for the purpose 
of a game if and only if the service follows obligations of disclosure to Group:Game and 
not to keep the record after stated game purpose has ended.  
(MobileService, read, Absolute_Location, GamePurpose, Group:Game, 
permit, _, StatedPurpose) 
4.6.3 Scenario 3  
As shown in Figure 4.9, the user’s contact information and location record may be sent 
to a business-associated company. The company may share the data with a third party 
(staff in the research centre). 
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Figure 4.9 Example Scenario 3: ToyMail 
Privacy Rules: 
S3.1 A child is using location services through a mobile service connected to a ToyMail 
toy. A service may be allowed to read a user’s absolute location for research purposes if 
and only if the company follows the obligations: the parent/guardian (data owner) 
provided consent for that usage, and the data must be deleted within a period of 6 
months. 
(MobileService, Read, Absolute_Location_Coarse, ResearchPurpose, Third-
party:ResearchCentre, _, {consent-owner, acknowledge-owner}, legal-
requirement-6months) 
Note that by default these privacy rules have not been established without the explicit 
consent of the location information owner. Therefore the system enforces a “deny” 
decision by default, until the system receives consent from the data owner, at which 
time the decision attribute will be updated as “allow.” 
4.7 Summary  
This chapter presented a privacy access control model for toy computing with a 
concentration on location privacy. The model allows parent/guardians to create privacy 
rules and receive acknowledgements regarding their child’s privacy sensitive location 
data. We defined the rules for the six privacy constraints defined in in Chapter 3, based 
on privacy requirements for toy computing based on PIPEDA and the 10 privacy 
principles, and proved how they are sufficient and necessary. Next, we presented the 
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algorithm for access control decisions for privacy enforcement, and finally we illustrated 
the applicability of the privacy rules in a practical environment using example scenarios 
with popular toy computing toys in the industry.   
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  Proposed Framework and Chapter 5
Prototype 
In this chapter we present a policy specification language using DPWS, WS-Policy and an 
extended XACML vocabulary for location privacy. We also provide a technical 
framework for implementation of the privacy access control model discussed in Chapter 
4 using Web and mobile services technologies. This framework is designed to enforce 
the location privacy preferences defined by parent/guardians for their children who are 
interacting in a toy computing environment. Finally, we provide a prototype 
implementation of this framework and a mockup interface for configuring privacy 
preferences. 
5.1 Scope and Prerequisites 
5.1.1 Scope 
This model is built from the perspective of privacy when a service is requesting access to 
end device location resources. In this model, depicted in Figure 5.1, the end user’s 
device is acting in the role of resource provider and the Web service is in the role of the 
requestor. There is a third entity, the Walled Garden Module (WGM), which acts as a 
trusted module to make access decisions for the mobile device. This will be discussed in 
greater detail later in the chapter. The model works on a per session basis, rather than 
per request. This end-to-end session between the three devices takes place upon the 
initial connection when the service is requesting location information form the user in 
order to provide services.  
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Figure 5.1 Request/Response Session Model 
The request is made by the service provider for the user to provide their absolute 
location (latitude and longitude). Once this location information is collected, the service 
may share the location with other entities (as outlined in their privacy policy). Sharing 
this information from the service to a third party will involve a different framework for 
communication, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, and is a potential area for 
future work.  
5.1.2 Prerequisites 
Entities should be authenticated before the process begins. When a user is engaged in a 
toy computing system, a function binds the user to the device and mobile service, which 
is then referred to as the subject. Further, this model assumes that the mobile service 
has published its privacy policy, which must be accurate and comply. Also, the 
parent/guardian must have published their privacy preferences onto the web server.  
5.2 Technical Framework for Privacy Enforcement 
This section presents the technical framework for privacy enforcement based on the 
IETF Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement [103]. First we will explain the entities 
involved, which will then be presented an illustrated model of the framework which 
describes how they interact with each other to facilitate access requests and decisions 
for privacy enforcement. 
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5.2.1 Description of Entities 
5.2.1.1 Mobile Service (Requestor) 
In this model, the service is acting in the role of the requestor. The requestor is 
attempting to access resources from the mobile device in order to provide appropriate 
services. A mobile service maintains a privacy policy as described below:  
 Privacy Policy: The mobile service has its own privacy policy which outlines 
information including how it will collect, manage, share, and retain the user’s 
personal data. The privacy policy is provided in XACML. We will go into further detail 
about privacy policies and vocabulary in a later section.  
5.2.1.2 Mobile Device (Provider) 
The mobile device acts as the provider in order to provide resources to the mobile 
service. Typically a mobile device will be owned by a single user. The mobile device 
hosts the following: 
 Resources: Resources located on the device are the object that the requester is 
attempting to gain access to. While this is privacy focused framework, this can 
include any type of resource that will provide personal and/or context-based 
information. For the purpose of this thesis, we will concentrate on location 
resources. Location resources provide data such as the user’s GPS coordinates 
and/or altitude, in an event or trace, as defined earlier in this chapter.  
 End Point Device Profile (EPDP): As part of DPWS, an EPDP exists to identify each 
device on the network [153]. The EPDP is based on DPWS, which allows for the 
implementation of mobile devices and services that combine several devices such as 
SOA. 
 Policy Enforcement Point (PDP): Each device has its own Policy Enforcement Point, 
proprietary to each device, which enforces the access decisions received from the 
PDP. The PEP will permit or deny the access requests based on the decision.  
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5.2.1.3 Walled Garden Module (Decision-Maker) 
The Walled Garden Module (WGM), as introduced in Chapter 1, acts as the decision 
maker in this scenario. The WGM can be located either as a protected module on the 
end user’s device, or on an external device such as a server. The WGM contains the 
following items:  
 User Privacy Preferences (UPP): These preferences are predefined by the user, 
associated with their EPDP and stored on the WGM. The UPP allows the user to 
define their preferences for how and which of their data will be collected, shared, 
retained, etc. These preferences will be defined in P3P with an extended vocabulary 
for location data, which will be described in more detail later in this chapter. 
 Policy Decision Point (PDP): The PDP is the entity that makes access decisions with 
WS-Policy based on the user’s privacy preferences and how they compare to the 
mobile service’s privacy policy. The PDP will compare both policies and send the 
decision response (PERMIT or DENY) to the PEP for enforcement.  
 Authorization Database (AD): The authorization database contains the profiles for 
users, devices, and services, along with corresponding permissions. This model will 
use positive authorization based on the contents of the authorization database, 
which defines a whitelist of what is permitted. The authorization database contains 
a pool of accepted entities, including accepted users, mobile services, and mobile 
devices. 
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5.2.2 Technical Framework Model 
 
Figure 5.2 Technical Framework Model 
Our formal model for privacy enforcement is illustrated in Figure 5.2. In this Service 
Oriented Architecture (SOA) model, the Web Service is acting in the role of Requestor for 
resources provided by the mobile device. The Walled Garden Module acts as a decision 
maker for access control, hosting the Policy Decision Point (PDP), which provides the 
access decision to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) for enforcement, as outlined in 
the IETF Abstract Model for Policy Enforcement [103], in WS-Policy. When the service 
requires access to a resource on the mobile device, it will (1) send an XML request to the 
PEP, which will then (2) forward the request to the PDP to make the access decision. The 
decision process for access control requires the PDP to compare the policies in (3) the 
authorization database, (4) the service Privacy Policy (PP), the (5) User Privacy 
Preferences (UPP) in P3P, and (6) the DPWS End Point Device Profile (EPDP). The 
service’s privacy policy outlines how the service will collect, use, retain, and share data 
collected from the resource. The user’s privacy preferences are provided by the user to 
define how they will allow their data to be collected, used, retained, shared, etc. The 
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PDP will find the relevant entries in the Privacy Policy and User Privacy Preferences, and 
then compare them to ensure that the PP is compliant to the user’s preferences. The 
DPWS End Point Device Profile is included in the request to the PDP, which identifies the 
mobile device to the WGM and associates it with the user’s privacy preferences. (7) If 
the service’s policies comply with the user’s privacy preferences, the PDP will send a 
RESPONSE PERMIT granting permission to the resource. If the policies do not comply, it 
will DENY access. (8) The PEP then forwards the decision RESPONSE to the service, and 
enforces the decision by either ending the session or (9) allowing the service to connect 
to location resources.  
5.2.3 Mathematical Model for Algorithm 
This section will examine the different parts of the model and how it works to protect 
privacy. The algorithm for the privacy enforcing model is described as follows. In Step 1, 
the mobile service sends the request to the PEP located on the device. The request 
contains the subject, user, operation, object, purpose(s), and recipient(s), as described 
in Section 4.2. Upon receiving a request, the Policy Decision Point will review the 
Authorization Database, which contains the profiles for users, devices, and services, 
along with their corresponding permissions. This model will use positive authorization 
based on the contents of the authorization database, which defines a whitelist of what 
is permitted. The authorization database contains a pool of accepted entities, including 
accepted mobile service URI’s, and mobile devices. In comparing the policies, the system 
uses the Access control algorithm presented in Section 4.5.3. After the authorization 
database, the next step is to compare the user privacy preferences with the service’s 
privacy policy. In this section we define how access decisions are made by the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP). The strategy which the PDP takes is to compare the access request 
with the User Privacy Preferences provided by the user, and with the Privacy Policy 
provided by the Mobile Service. Finally, when the access decision is made by the PDP, 
the decision is forwarded to the mobile device for enforcement. If permitted, the mobile 
service binds to the location resource, if denied, the connection is declined. The 
algorithm is described below:   
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Pre-requisites: First, as a prerequisite, we check that all of the entities are authorized in 
the system. When the user is engaged with a toy computing system the subject is 
formed by binding the user ug, with the device dj and a mobile service msm. The device 
also connects to the walled garden module. 
msm.urii ∈ URI, where URI is the pool of accepted mobile service URI’s  
∧ dj ∈ DEVICES, where DEVICES is the pool of accepted devices  
∧ uk ∈ owner(dj), the user(uk) is the owner of the device dj  
∧ urii ∈ dj(Permit), the requesting URI (urii) is in device dj’s pool of accepted URI’s  
IF urii ∉ dj(Permit) ∧ urii ∉ dj(Reject)  
s = bind(ug, dj, msm,) ∧ connect(dj, wgmz), where s ∈ SUBJECTS ∧ ug ∈ USERS ∧ 
msm ∈ MOBILE_SERVICES ∧ dj  ∈ DEVICES ∧ wgmz ∈ WGM 
Policy Enforcement Algorithm: 
1. send(msm, dj.PEP, Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp)), where s ∈ SUBJECTS, u ∈ USERS, op 
= {“read”}, pp ⊆ PURPOSES, rp ⊆ RECIPIENTS  
2. forward(dj.PEP, wgmz.PDP, Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp)) 
3. checkPolicy(wgmz.PDP, Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp)){ 
compare Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp), wgmk.authDatabase 
if != deny{ 
compare(Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp), msm.PP ) 
compare(Request(s, u, op, o, pp, rp), wgmk.UPP)  
compare(msm.PP, wgmk.UPP) 
compare(wgm. , dj.EPDP) 
if true, return PERMIT; 
else return DENY; } 
4. response(wgmk.PDP,dj.PEP, response(decision)), where decision ∈ {“permit”| 
“deny”} 
5. forward(dj.PEP, msm, response(decision)) 
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6. if response(decision) == “permit”{ 
bind(dj.resource, msm) 
 } 
In the current version of this model, we are assuming that policies don’t change. The 
authorization database contains logs for authorization decisions based on historical 
accesses. While this makes the system faster because it does not have to review the 
policies every time, the limitations are that the access decisions may not be up to date if 
a user has changed their privacy preferences, or if a mobile service has changed its 
privacy policy. Future works will include version checking to keep the best of both 
worlds, speeding up access decisions when policies have not changed, but allowing for 
policies to be kept up to date. 
5.3 Policy Language Vocabulary and Functions 
In this section we will extend the XACML policy vocabulary for managing access requests 
to location data. This thesis presents an extension to the XACML vocabulary to include 
references specific to location data, based on the core and extended access control 
entities described in Chapter 4. 
Table 5.1 Implementation of Access Control Entities in XACML 
Core Access Control Entities XACML Implementation 
Users Subjects 
Subjects (mobile service) Subjects 
Objects Resources 
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Table 5.2 Implementation of extended privacy entities in XACML 







Table 5.3 Location Resource Attributes 
Location Resource Attributes XACML Implementation 
Absolute Location (Coarse) Absolute_location_coarse 
Absolute Location (Fine) Absolute_location_fine 
Relative Location Relative_location 
 
Based on the extended XACML vocabulary for privacy access control for location data, 
an XACML implementation of a policy, request, and response are illustrated below. 
5.3.1 Policy 
We have created an example policy, which has been split into two documents: the core 
XACML policy, and the extended XACML policy with privacy entities. The core XACML 
policy includes all of the entities for Combined, the below example of a policy can be 
summarized as follows: MobileToyService can access Bob's coarse absolute location for 
the purpose of the game, to recipients of the group playing the game. A permitted 
request must follow the obligation of no disclosure, and no retention. 
5.3.1.1 Core XACML Policy 
The core XACML policy is defined as follows: subject MobileToyService can perform the 
action “read” on Bob’s coarse absolute location. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
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<Policy 
    xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 
    xmlns='urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os' xmlns:xacml-
context='urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os' 
    xsi:schemaLocation='urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os 
access_control-xacml-2.0-policy-schema-os.xsd' 
    PolicyId="TestPolicy" 
    RuleCombiningAlgId="identifier:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-overrides">     
    <Description>Example XACML Access Control Policy</Description>    
    <Rule RuleId="1" Effect="Permit"> 
        <Description> 
Rule 1: The subject MobileToyService can read Bob's coarse 
absolute location data. 
        </Description> 
        <Target>        
            <Subjects> 
                <Subject> 
                    <SubjectMatch> 
                        <AttributeValue> 
MobileToyService 
                 </AttributeValue> 
                    </SubjectMatch> 
                </Subject> 
            </Subjects>             
            <Resources> 
                <Resource> 
                 <ResourceMatch> 
    <AttributeValue>           
Bob:Absolute_Location_Coarse 
    </AttributeValue> 
                    </ResourceMatch> 
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                </Resource> 
            </Resources>             
            <Actions> 
                <Action> 
                 <ActionMatch> 
                        <AttributeValue> 
Read 
    </AttributeValue> 
                 </ActionMatch> 
                </Action> 
            </Actions> 
        </Target>                 
    </Rule> 
</Policy> 
5.3.1.2 Extended XACML Policy with Privacy Entities 
This section presents the extended policy containing the extended policy for privacy 
entities, which is combined with the core XACML policy above.  
<Policy 
    xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' 




    xsi:schemaLocation='urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os 
extendedPolicySchema.xsd' 
    PolicyId="ExtendedPolicy" 
    RuleCombiningAlgId="identifier:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-
overrides">     
<Description> 
Example Extended XACML Access Control Policy 
</Description>    
    <Rule RuleId="1" Effect="Permit"> 
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        <Description> 
Rule 1: The purpose must be for "GamePurpose" and 
recipients must be limited to the group of users playing 
the game. 
        </Description> 
        <Target>        
            <Purposes> 
                <Purpose>                 
                    <PurposeMatch > 
                        <AttributeValue>GamePurpose</AttributeValue> 
                    </PurposeMatch> 
                </Purpose>            
            </Purposes>             
            <Recipients> 
                <Recipient> 
                    <RecipientMatch> 
                        <AttributeValue>Group:Game</AttributeValue> 
                    </RecipientMatch> 
                </Recipient> 
            </Recipients> 
        </Target>         
            <Obligations> 
                <Obligation> 
                    <ObligationMatch> 
                        <AttributeValue>No-Disclosure</AttributeValue> 
                    </ObligationMatch> 
                </Obligation> 
            </Obligations>             
            <Retentions>                            
                <Retention> 
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                    <RetentionMatch> 
                        <AttributeValue>No-Retention</AttributeValue> 
                    </RetentionMatch> 
                </Retention> 
            </Retentions> 
    </Rule>    
</Policy> 
5.3.2 Example Scenario 1: Permit 
Recall from Chapter 4, a Request is a 5-tuple <Subject, Operation, Object, Purpose(s), 
Recipient(s)>. In this model, a location access request occurs when a service is 
requesting access to the location resources on a user’s device. A subject is <toys, 
devices, mobile_service>. The name of the mobile service (associated with its URI) is be 
used to identify the requestor. The object is a coarse absolute location resource. For the 
purpose of this work, operation will always be read. In the below example, a mobile 
service is requesting access to a user’s location resources. The subject is identified by 
the name of the service. The resource is described using the extended attribute value 
absolute_location_coarse, which identifies that the resource is the user’s coarse 
absolute location. Next, the action is read, and the purpose is stated as game purposes. 
Lastly, the recipient is limited to the group of other players currently active in the game 
session. Note that the core and extended request are given in the same document. 
5.3.2.1 Example Request 1 
<Request> 
    <Subject> 
        <Attribute>MobileToyService</Attribute> 
    </Subject> 
    <Resource>         
        <AttributeValue>current_location_absolute_coarse</AttributeValue>       
    </Resource> 
    <Action>        
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            <AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue> 
    </Action> 
</Request> 
<RequestExtended> 
    <Purpose> 
        <AttributeValue>GamePurpose</AttributeValue> 
    </Purpose>     
    <Recipient> 
        <AttributeValue>Group:Game</AttributeValue> 
    </Recipient> 
</RequestExtended> 
5.3.2.2 Example Response 1: Permit 
Response is a 3-tuple <Decision, Obligation(s), Retention>, where the decision is either 
permit or deny, obligations are the terms which the service must agree to, and retention 
is the retention policy for how long the object can be retained. Based on the above 
policy, the request will be permitted. A successful response will be returned as follows: 
As described above, the response contains a decision (permit), along with the 
obligations of the service to agree to non-disclosure obligations. Next, the response also 
includes a retention policy to not retain the data. 
5.3.2.3 Example Request 2 
In this second example request, MobileToyService is requesting Bob’s absolute location 
for game purposes and marketing purposes. 
<Request> 
    <Subject> 
        <Attribute>MobileToyService</Attribute> 
    </Subject> 
    <Resource>         
        <AttributeValue>Bob:location_absolute_coarse</AttributeValue>       
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    </Resource> 
    <Action>        
            <AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue> 
    </Action> 
</Request> 
<RequestExtended> 
    <Purpose> 
        <AttributeValue>GamePurpose</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue>MarketingPurpose</AttributeValue> 
    </Purpose>     
    <Recipient> 
        <AttributeValue>Group:Game</AttributeValue> 
        <AttributeValue>ThirdParty:Marketing</AttributeValue> 
    </Recipient> 
</RequestExtended> 
5.3.2.4 Example Response 2: Deny 
Since the above request does not comply with the policy, the request will be denied.  
<Response> 
    <Result> 
        <Decision>Deny</Decision>       
        <Status> 
            <StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
        </Status> 
</Response> 
5.3.2.5 Example Request 3 
This request contains an unrecognized subject and a typo in the <Purpose> tag. 
<Request> 
    <Subject> 
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        <Attribute>OtherService</Attribute> 
    </Subject> 
    <Resource>         
        <AttributeValue>current_location_absolute_coarse</AttributeValue>       
    </Resource> 
    <Action>        
        <AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue> 
    </Action> 
</Request> 
<RequestExtended> 
    <Prupose> 
        <AttributeValue>GamePurpose</AttributeValue> 
    </Prupose>     
    <Recipient> 
        <AttributeValue>Group:Game</AttributeValue> 
    </Recipient> 
</RequestExtended> 
5.3.2.6 Example Response 3: NotApplicable 
Because the request included a typo resulting in an unrecognized field, a response of 
“NotApplicable” will occur. 
<Response> 
    <Result> 
        <Decision>NotApplicable</Decision>       
        <Status> 
            <StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:missing-
attribute"/> 
        </Status> 
    </Result> 
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5.4 Prototype Implementation 
We have developed a prototype implementation of the privacy access control model 
and privacy enforcement framework. This prototype demonstrates how the framework 
can be implemented in a real world environment to preserve privacy through mobile 
services technologies. 
5.4.1 Proof of Concept: Policy Enforcement Demo 
5.4.1.1 System Architecture 
Like in the privacy enforcement framework, the system architecture for the prototype 
implementation consists of three devices: the client acting as the resource requestor, 
the host acting as the resource provider, and an external server acting as the Walled 
Garden Module for making policy decisions. In this simulation, the host device is the one 
that the child would be using during a toy computing game. The client is acting in place 
of a mobile service which is attempting to access the host’s location resources. The 
devices communicate using Java Multi Edition DPWS Stack (JMEDS) [154], which is a 
lightweight, modular and extendable software framework for DPWS in Java-based 
environments including Android.  
In this BYOD-like architecture, the Walled Garden Module provides a trusted platform 
for making access decisions based on the policies. Parents can create and store their 
privacy preferences for their children on the Walled Garden Module, which will make 
access decisions for the child’s mobile device. This also prevents large amounts of 
processing and storage of policies from having to take place on the mobile device. The 
Walled Garden Module is running an XACML engine by Sun Microsystems [155], along 
with a custom co-engine we built over top of it with extra entities for location privacy 
model. The XACML engine and co-engine parse the XACML policies and make an access 
decision accordingly. Figure 5.3 illustrates the implementation model and program flow. 
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Figure 5.3 Implementation Model 
In this model, the process begins when (1) the client device sends a request to the host 
device via JMEDS using SOAP. (2) The host device will then process this request using 
XPath sending the noteworthy parts of the message (such as what it is requesting, 
permissions, and ID of the requestor) to the Walled Garden Module, which is a Linux 
Server. (3) The Walled Garden Module is running Sun will compare the incoming request 
with a XACML policy, which can be changed by the system owner and depending on the 
contents of the request, (4) will issue a “Permit,” “Deny,” “NotApplicable,” or 
“Indeterminate” decision to the host device, (5) which will act accordingly by either 
accepting or rejecting the request. Access decisions are described as follows: 
 A permit decision will permit the requestor to access the requested resources. 
 A deny decision will not permit the requestor to access the requested resources. 
 A decision of NotApplicable is a result of a missing attribute, syntax error, or 
processing error. As a result, the access request will be denied. 
 An Indeterminate decision means that multiple policies apply to the request and as a 
result the system is unable to determine a decision. As a result, the access request 
will be denied. 
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Referring to our privacy framework in Section 5.2.2, the PDP is the XACML engine and 
co-engine located on the Walled Garden Module, which makes the policy decisions 
based on policy rules in the stored policy. The PDP sends the decision to the PEP, which 
is the host device, to enforce the decision.  
5.4.1.2 Technical Configuration 
Location management on Android devices is done using the Location Manager system, 
GPS, Cell-ID and Wi-Fi. Each method offers varying levels of accuracy, and ideally the 
most accurate solution, GPS, will be used. The system maintains a cached coordinate, 
which is used unless it is considered as too old. In this case, the system will retrieve a 
coordinate using Wi-Fi. If this coordinate is inaccurate, the system will retrieve a 
location using GPS instead.  Updates on the user’s location can be obtained by assigning 
the Location Manager to request Location Updates from a Location Listener that 
pinpoints the user’s location using one of the mentioned methods. 
The WalledGardenModule uses several external libraries as well as default libraries. For 
the Server application, XPath and Sun’s XACML implementation are used to parse the 
incoming Request Documents and the stored Policies. The mobile application uses XPath 
to parse the Response from the server. File transfer between the mobile application and 
the server is done through a TCP socket to ensure file delivery. 
Table 5.4 shows the technical configurations of the three devices used in the prototype 
implementation environment described above. The client and host are both Android 
devices, and the server, acting as the Walled Garden Module, is running Ubuntu.  
Table 5.4 Technical Configuration 
Walled Garden Module (Web Server) 
Manufacturer IBM 
OS Linux Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS Server x64 
CPU Intel Xeon E5-2609 v2 @ 2.50GHz 
Memory 2GB 
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Host Device (Service Provider) 
Manufacturer Huawei 
Model U9510E 
OS Android 4.0.4 
CPU Quad-core Cortex-A9 @ 1.4GHZ 
GPU Vivante GC4000 
Memory 1GB 
Client Device (Service Requestor) 
Manufacturer HTC 
Model One V 
OS Android 4.0.3 
CPU Scorpion @ 1.0GHz 
GPU Adreno 205 
Memory 512MB 
5.4.2 Mockup Interface Demo 
We have developed a mockup interface for parents/guardians to use in an initial setup 
to configure preferences and create policy rules, as described in Section 4.5.2.1. These 
options would appear during initial setup of a toy computing application. 
5.4.2.1  Profile Setup 
The first step in the configuration process is the Profile Setup phase. The Profile Setup 
phase includes three sections, the Parent/Guardian Contact Details, Child Information, 
and Privacy Policy Review.  
 
 shows the first two screens of the Profile Setup Phase. In the first screen, the 
parent/guardian enters their basic information including name and email address, and 
then selects if they wish to receive email updates on their child’s privacy-related 
information. Next, on the Child Information page, the child’s first name is entered for 
management purposes, and the parent/guardian then agrees to take ownership over 
their child’s data.  
A Location Privacy Model and Framework for Mobile Toy Computing  
- 129 - 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Profile Setup: Parent/Guardian Details and Child Information 
 
Next, the privacy policy of the mobile toy application is presented to the 
parent/guardian to review. The parent/guardian reviews the policy and must confirm 
that they have read and agree to the terms before proceeding.  
Figure 5.5 shows this screen with the Tek Recon privacy policy. By agreeing to the terms, 
the parent/guardian is providing consent on their child’s behalf. 
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Figure 5.5 Review Privacy Policy 
5.4.2.2 Configuring Privacy Rules 
The next phase of the setup is the Privacy Rule creation phase. In this phase, the 
parent/guardian is able to create one or more privacy rules for how their child’s private 
location data is used. By default there are no policy rules yet configured. As shown in 
Figure 5.6, a new rule can be created or a template can be used. Templates of useful 
policy rules can be provided to simplify the rule configuration process for 
parents/guardians. However, in this example we will show how to create an entirely 
new rule from scratch.  
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Figure 5.6 Create a New Rule 
The first step of creating a new privacy rule is the General Settings, as shown in Figure 
5.7. In the General Settings, the parent/guardian can name the rule, provide a 
description, and set an expiry date for how long the rule will be in effect. Next, in the 
Core Access Control settings, the mobile service (subject), location resource (object), 
and operation are selected. The objects selected are the absolute location and relative 
location.  
Next, the settings for Purposes and Recipients are also presented in Figure 5.7. The 
parent/guardian chooses from a list of purposes they wish to accept, as well as a list of 
types of recipients. The types of recipients can be expanded to be more specific, such as 
Third-Party: Marketing, or Group: Game Players. 
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Figure 5.7 Create New Rule: General, Core Access Control, Purposes and Recipients 
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The next steps are the Obligations and Retention settings, and then finally reviewing and 
adding the rule, as shown in Figure 5.8. In Obligations and Retention settings, the 
parent/guardian first selects the obligations that the service must comply with upon 
receiving the child’s data. Obligations can include compliance with PIPEDA or COPPA. 
The parent/guardian can also search from a list of other obligations, or input a custom 
obligation policy. For retention, the parent/guardian can select how long they wish to 
allow their child’s data to be retained. Finally, on the Review & Add Rule page, the 
privacy rule is presented in plain English. Once the parent/guardian reviews the rule, 
they can select “Confirm and Add Rule” at the bottom of the screen. 
Once a privacy rule is added, the parent/guardian is directed to the Manage Privacy 
Rules page, illustrated in Figure 5.9. The Manage Privacy Rules page shows a table of all 
of the configured privacy rules and their status (e.g. enabled, disabled, or expired). This 
provides options to enable, disable, edit, delete, or create new rules. A parent/guardian 
can also return to this screen at a later time to manage rules or renew expired rules. 
Figure 5.8 Obligations and Retention, and Review and Add Rule 
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Once the parent/guardian is satisfied with the privacy rules, he/she can select “Next” to 
be directed to the final Review & Finish page. This page summarizes all of the settings 
and confirms that the parent/guardian has completed all of the sections. A list of 
enabled privacy rules and their corresponding expiry dates is also presented. Finally, the 
parent/guardian can select “Save and Finish” to save their settings and finish the setup. 
Once the setup is finished, the settings will take effect immediately. 
 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter we presented a technical framework for privacy enforcement based on 
the IETF abstract model for policy enforcement, and adapted it to a toy computing 
context using mobile services technologies and the concept of Walled Garden. We 
showed the mathematical model and algorithm for the framework to explain the policy 
Figure 5.9 Manage Privacy Rules, and Review and Finish 
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decision and enforcement process. Next, we examined the XACML request and response 
with some examples. Finally, we presented a prototype implementation of the 
framework model using two Android devices and an Ubuntu server and communicating 
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  Conclusions and Future Chapter 6
Works 
6.1 Thesis Summary 
This thesis has aimed to address the unique location privacy requirements for children 
using toy computing technology. Privacy laws such as PIPEDA and the 10 principles of 
privacy, as well as the many industry and international organizations such as UNICEF and 
ITU, stress for the protection of children’s personal data online. Motivated by this, we 
have provided an access control model to protect the location privacy of children in toy 
computing. While there is no universal privacy framework for toy computing, we have 
presented a technical policy enforcement framework using a Walled Garden Module. 
We provided a prototype implementation of this framework using an extended XACML 
vocabulary. We have presented a privacy access control model designed specifically to 
protect children’s location data in a toy computing environment, allowing parents to 
create privacy preferences for how their child’s location data can be collected, used, 
shared, and retained.  
6.2 Limitations 
Although this thesis presents a study of the requirements for privacy based on existing 
research, legislation and current industry regulations, and validates the requirements 
through mathematical proofs and proof of concept prototypes. However, there is 
further work to be done in the form of empirical studies and surveys of toy companies, 
parents, and children to validate that this model and framework is necessary and meets 
the requirements of practical application. From an end user perspective, this model 
requires that parents are able to understand and properly configure the privacy settings 
to adequately reflect their preferences.  
This model and framework relies on a foundation of security. We assume that the 
mobile device is trusted (TCB). Further, this work operates under the assumption of an 
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architecture such as Android, where applications are sandboxed. In this architecture, 
applications require permissions to access resources such as GPS. Another limitation is 
that service providers must comply with their stated privacy policies, as this model 
provides limited enforcement in terms of policy compliance.  
6.2.1 Further Works for Toy Computing 
In the context of toy computing, there are many other types of sensitive context data 
that can be collected on children, as described in Section 2.1.3.1. The vocabulary 
presented in this thesis can be extended for other toy computing privacy concerns 
beyond location. Further, a management interface can be developed for 
parents/guardians to easily configure the privacy preferences for their children. Future 
work includes exploring the best way to present the system to parents/guardians so that 
they can easily set policy options and make informed decisions so that they can be 
confident about their children’s privacy.  
6.2.2 Mobile Services Cluster for BYOD 
The privacy enforcement framework presented in this thesis can also be extended for a 
wider range of applications in other areas of pervasive and mobile computing, such as 
healthcare, transportation systems, manufacturing, infrastructure protection, power 
grids, and process control [42]. A future area of research is to adapt the privacy 
framework to a BYOD cluster infrastructure, using the concept of the Walled Garden 
Module built on a Raspberry Pi computer to connect to the mobile devices via USB or 
Bluetooth as shown in Figure 6.1. In this model, Raspberry Pi computers [156] which 
consist of a credit-card-sized single-board computer, are used to build a scalable, 
interoperable, and flexible Mobile Services Cluster in a Lego bricks-built server rack with 
easy movability and composability. Each system represents a simulated mobile service 
which is interconnected through a multi-root tree topology in a Top of Rack (ToR) switch 
manner, in which the computers in the same rack are connected to one or two Ethernet 
switches installed inside the rack and to the rest of the topology through an OpenFlow 
enabled aggregation switch. OpenFlow is an open standard that can support 
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experiments to run on a network, without requiring vendors to expose the internal 
workings of their network devices such as Ethernet switches, routers and wireless 
access points. 
 
Figure 6.1 Mobile Services Cluster for BYOD 
Further, the framework can be extended for security policy enforcement. Figure 6.2 
shows the technical model of our proposed framework from the perspective of security 
policy enforcement, where the mobile device acts in the role of requestor for resources 
provided by the mobile services. In this case, the goal of the Walled Garden Module is 
act as a broker to enforce the security policies for the mobile service. The enforcement 
decision is once again determined by the PDP, this time located on the service side, 
which compares the service’s security policy to the EPDP of the mobile device. If 
permission is granted, the resources are sent to the Intermediate Resources Storage 
based on the concept of Isolation Space [157] within the Walled Garden Module, which 
can then be accessed by the device. The Walled Garden Module contains data or 
application processing within a secure framework on the personal device (BYOD) so that 
it is segregated from personal data.  
A Location Privacy Model and Framework for Mobile Toy Computing  
- 139 - 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Security Policy Framework 
6.3 Thesis Conclusions 
This thesis has presented a privacy access control model and technical framework for 
protecting children’s location data in a toy computing environment. Toy computing is a 
developing research area and to the best of our knowledge, this concept of location 
privacy policy-based access control specific to toys has scarcely been explored in other 
research works. There is currently no widespread industry model for privacy 
enforcement for toy computing. This thesis presents a novel access control model and 
technical framework for children’s location data in a toy computing environment, which 
to the best of our knowledge is the first of its kind.  
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